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ABSTRACT
Hazardous wastes are generated by many industries in the United States.
Because of the dangerous nature of these substances, facilities are needed to
treat, store and dispose of them. Before a hazardous waste facility can be
constructed, however, a suitable site needs to be found. Locating appropriate
sites for hazardous waste facilities is not an easy task because of risks associated
with the facilities. For this reason, most communities do not want to host a
facility. Still, facilities have been sited in the past and are still in operation.
There is convincing evidence to support the claim that hazardous waste
facilities are found in disproportionate numbers in minority and low-income
communities across the United States. To the extent that this is true, this thesis
explores some reasons that may be responsible for the trend. Specifically,
existing state siting schemes may be ill-suited to address issues of environmental
equity. Thus, the disparity in where facilities are located may be addressed
through improved siting mechanisms.
This thesis proposes a state siting scheme to site hazardous waste facilities
in an equitable manner, with respect to race and income. The proposal advances
several guidelines applicable to hazardous waste facility siting models. These
include factoring considerations of race, income, geographic fairness, and history
of past siting decisions into siting processes.
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Title: Visiting Lecturer
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I. INTRODUCTION
The benefits of living in a modem society are many. Products and services,
provided and produced by industries in the United States, enhance living
standards. Industries ranging from services to manufacturing have an impact on
most every aspect of modem life. Industries, however, generate, consume, and
release tons of toxic chemicals annually in the United States. In 1990 alone, about
19,600 industrial plants released over 3.5 billion pounds of toxic substances.1
Many manufacturing processes generate hazardous wastes, in addition to
a finished product or service. Specifically, hazardous wastes are wastes either
that can cause or significantly contribute to death or serious irreversible or
incapacitating illness on account of quantity, concentration, or physical, chemical,
or infectious characteristics, or that represent a substantial or potential danger to
human health or the environment when mismanaged. 2 Because of the
dangerous nature of hazardous wastes, facilities are needed to treat, store, or
permanently dispose of them.
There are six major types of hazardous waste facilities: 1) waste transfer
centers where wastes are examined, identified, and differentiated for further
processing or transport to other facilities; 2) liquid organics recovery facilities
where liquid organic wastes are examined for the existence of possible recyclable
components; 3) solidification, stabilization, and other specialized treatment
facilities that change liquids into solids, make wastes less threatening to ground
water, and destroy the wastes' harmful ingredients; 4) water treatment facilities
that convert otherwise contaminated water to drinkable water; 5) incineration
facilities where non-reclaimable, combustible organic liquids and solids are
1S. 1161, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1) (1993).
242 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (1988).
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broken down into their basic elements; and 6) impregnable landfills where only
wastes that cannot be recoverable are permanently stored. 3 In short, hazardous
waste facilities render hazardous wastes non-hazardous through some
neutralizing process or contain the wastes, either temporarily or for many years.
Taken together, these facilities are referred to as hazardous waste facilities
throughout this thesis.
To maintain living standards and to continue disposing, treating, and
storing hazardous wastes safely and efficiently in the United States, more
hazardous waste facilities are needed.3a Consequently, there will always be a
demand for suitable sites where additional facilities can be located. Finding such
sites, however, is both complex and controversial.
Siting hazardous waste facilities is complex because a potential site must
meet many criteria. For instance, for certain types of facilities, a potential site
must rest on geologically stable land and must not be near sources of water used
by persons and for agriculture. Transportation routes to and from the site are
also important considerations, as are population densities surrounding both the
site and transportation routes. These are only a small sample of many
requirements and considerations associated with finding an appropriate site for a
hazardous waste facility.4
3 Celeste P. Duffy, State Hazardous Waste Facility Siting: Easing the Process Through Local
Cooperation and Preemption, 11 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 755, 768 (1984) (citing CLARK-
MCGLENNON ASSOCIATES, AN INTRODUCTION TO FACILITIES FOR HAZARDOUS WASTE
MANAGEMENT, IV-V (1980)).
3a Beyond the need to treat, dispose, or store new wastes, wastes taken from or lying in old
disposal sites also need suitable facilities. As David Morell and Christopher Magorian indicate,
"[tlhe United States also needs new sites and new facilities in which to place those wastes which
still remain to be removed from the terrible legacies of past improper disposal ...." DAVID
MORELL & CHRISTOPHER MAGORIAN, STING HAZARDOUS WASTE FACILITIES: LOCAL
OPPOSITION AND THE MYTH OF PREEMPTION 5 (1982).
4 See Clark-McGlennon Associates, Inc., Criteria for Evaluating Sites, in HAZARDOUS
MATERIALS HAZARDOUS WASTE: LOCAL MANAGEMENT OPTIONS 133-145 (Raymond D.
Scanlon ed., 1987) and MICHAEL R. GREENBERG & RICHARD F. ANDERSON, HAZARDOUS
WASTE SITES: THE CREDIBILITY GAP 84-104 (1984) for general discussions of siting criteria.
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Siting hazardous waste facilities also is a controversial endeavor because
of risks associated with the wastes contained in such facilities. 5 For example,
explosions or accidents while hazardous wastes are being transported can result
in dangerous exposures to surrounding communities. Mishandling of hazardous
wastes in facilities can have dire consequences on host communities and
agricultural lands if wastes are released into the environment. Other related
risks include the uncertain effects hazardous wastes have on human and
biological health in general. In 1991, for example, the National Research Council
reported that exposure to hazardous waste is related to "a variety of symptoms
of ill health in exposed persons, including low birth weight, cardiac anomalies,
headache, fatigue, and a constellation of neurobehavioral problems."6
Moreover, the same report indicated that "some studies have detected excesses
of cancer in residents exposed to compounds, such as those that occur at
hazardous-waste sites."7
Beyond risks associated with physical contamination by hazardous
wastes, there are other risks that make siting hazardous waste facilities
contentious. For example, the facility can have adverse economic ramifications
The criteria discussed in these sources not include race, income or history of prior siting
practices.
5 The risks and effects of hazardous waste facilities on surrounding communities and their
residents are, at best, uncertain. See generally GREENBERG & ANDERSON, supra note 4, at 84-
104; James M. Melvins et al., Facility Siting and Health Questions: The Burden of Health Risk
Uncertainty, 17 NAT. RES. LAW. 467 (1984). See also NICHOLAS FREUDENBERG, NOT IN OUR
BACKYARDS!: COMMUNITY ACTION FOR HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT 42-59 (1984). But
see Joan Z. Bernstein, The Siting of Commercial Waste Facilities: An Evolution of Community Land
Use Decisions, 1 KAN. J. L. & PUB. FOL'Y 83, 85 (1991) ("only a very small number of the
epidemiological investigations of [populations living near hazardous waste sites] have shown
any clear associations between the incidence of serious diseases and the presence of waste sites
or contaminated media.").
6 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENVIRONMENTAL EPIDEMIOLOGY -- PUBLIC HEALTH
AND HAZARDOUS WASTES 19-20 (1991); see also Naikang Tsao, Ameliorating Environmental
Racism: A Citizen's Guide to Combatting the Discriminatory Siting of Toxic Waste Dumps, 67 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 366, 374 n.49 (1992).
7 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 6, at 19-20; see also Tsao, supra note 6, at 374
n.49.
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on neighboring communities.8 Noise and traffic generated by such facilities
may have a negative impact on nearby communities thereby making the facility
a locally unwanted land use. As such, hazardous waste facilities may have a
detrimental effect on the value of surrounding property: because most people
would not want knowingly to live near or adjacent to a hazardous waste facility,
there may be a reduced demand for the property that translates to lower
property values.
In short, health and economic risks associated with hazardous waste
facilities make siting these facilities a complicated enterprise. Although a full
discussion of risks associated with hazardous waste facilities is beyond the scope
of this discussion, the thesis assumes that such risks will always be affiliated with
the facilities. Indeed, many residents have opposed proposals to site facilities in
their communities largely due to these risks. Opposition to the siting of
hazardous waste facilities can be seen as a logical response to the imposition of
localized risks on a small population when a greater number of persons not
living near the site benefit from the facility yet face fewer risks.9
Given the risks associated with hazardous waste facilities and the fact that
most people would not want a facility sited near their homes or in their
communities, siting these facilities involves balancing a number of factors. First,
there is the societal need for the facilities, and for efficient and cost effective
8These facilities, however, do have some benefits. For example, they frequently provide
employment opportunities and enhance the tax base for the communities in which they are
located. They provide much needed safe disposal space for otherwise dangerous materials and
substances, which might instead be disposed of in highly dangerous and illegal ways.
9 See LAWRENCE SUSSKIND, THE SmNG PUZZLE: BALANCING ECONOMIC AND
ENVIRONMENTAL GAINS AND LOSSES 1-2 (1985):
[Riegionally necessary facilities [such as hazardous waste facilities] offer only modest
benefits to very large numbers of people while imposing rather substantial costs (or at
least potential risks) on relatively small numbers of abutters. While the full set of
"gains" to all the "gainers" may far outweigh the actual or potential "losses" to the losers,
the losers are more inclined to fight to stop such projects than the gainers are to see that
they are built."
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provision of services provided by them. At the same time, the effects the
facilities can have on host communities, such as economic stability and public
health, are also important considerations. 10
In spite of public opposition to the siting of hazardous waste facilities,
many have been sited and are in operation. Recent studies on the demographics
of communities in which hazardous waste facilities are located, however, suggest
that the facilities are found disproportionately in minority11 and poor
communities. 12 This phenomenon is responsible for the coining of various terms
descriptive of the unequal distribution of environmental risks associated with
hazardous waste facilities. These terms include "environmental justice",
"environmental poverty", and "environmental racism."13 Furthermore, the
apparent unequal distribution of environmental risks also has given rise to a
concept known as "environmental equity", or the equal distribution of
environmental risks across minority and income groups.14 This thesis is
10 NEW YORK CITY PLANNING COMMISSION, CRITERIA FOR THE LOCATION OF CITY
FACILITIES 2 (1990). For the purposes of this thesis, a host community is a community in which
a hazardous waste facility is located.
11For the purposes of this thesis, minority and ethnic persons refers to Blacks, Hispanics,
Asian/ Pacific Islanders, American Indians and other non-white persons. The term Blacks, and
not African Americans, is used throughout because of the broad range of persons of that race
who originate from countries not in Africa.
12 See, infra, Part III.A for more discussion of these studies. For the purposes of this thesis,
the poor are persons living in households below poverty levels as defined by the United States
Bureau of the Census Also, for the purposes of this thesis, minority and poor communities are
communities in which live high percentages of poor and minorities, relative to national
averages, or where minorities and poor persons comprise a majority of the community's
population, unless otherwise indicated. Further, for the purposes of this thesis, a community is
defined as residential 5-digit ZIP code areas, unless otherwise indicated.
13See, e.g., 1 Environmental Protection Agency, Environmental Equity: Reducing Risk for
All Communities 10 (1992) [hereinafter EPA EQUITY REPORT]; Charles Lee, Toxic Wastes and
Race in the United States, in RACE AND THE INCIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS: A
TIME FOR DISCOURSE 10 (Bunyan Bryant & Paul Mohai eds., 1992) [hereinafter
ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS]; Luke W. Cole, Correspondence, Remedies for Environmental
Racism: A View from the Field, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1991, 1992 (1992). Cole refers to the legal field
of environmental racism as "environmental poverty law -- that is, representing low income
communities (often, in this field, communities of color) facing environmental hazards." Cole,
supra, at 1992.
14See EPA EQUITY REPORT, supra note 13, at 2.
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concerned in particular with the equal distribution of hazardous waste facilities
across race and income groups.
The thesis investigates some of the reasons why hazardous waste facilities
are located disproportionately in minority and poor communities. One possible
cause is the manner in which the facilities are sited. I suggest that state siting
processes are ill-suited to produce environmentally equitable results.
Accordingly, I propose a state siting scheme that addresses environmental
equity, with the goal of distributing hazardous waste facilities in a more
equitable manner so that poor and minority communities do not host
disproportionate numbers of these facilities.
The thesis begins with a general discussion of the philosophical and moral
underpinnings for environmental equity. Part II concludes that in a
constitutional democracy such as the United States, basic ideals of equality and
democracy inherent in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution
support the proposition that no one minority group should carry an unequal
burden of environmental risks associated with hazardous waste facilities. 15 Part
III presents evidence showing a disproportionate incidence of hazardous waste
facilities in minority and poor communities. Part III also discusses public
opposition to the siting of hazardous waste facilities and the claims of some
commentators that the opposition may contribute to the higher numbers of
facilities in minority and poor communities, and concludes with a critique of
15Although the thesis includes income groups in its discussion for the need for
environmental equity, the U.S. Supreme Court has indicated that wealth classifications do not
warrant strict scrutiny under equal protection analysis. E.g., James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137
(1971) (in an equal protection challenge to a California constitutional bar of the state from
developing low income housing, Supreme Court held wealth classifications alone do not trigger
strict scrutiny). A lower degree of judicial scrutiny -- rational relationship -- is all that the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides for poverty and wealth classifications.
See GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 685-87 (11th ed. 1985). The thesis suggests
only that siting policies should include considerations of income when deciding where to locate
facilities, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's refusal to grant poverty and wealth the same
status as race in equal protection jurisprudence.
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studies documenting the unequal placement of hazardous waste facilities in poor
and minority communities and provides suggestions for further research. Part
IV discusses the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act and outlines various
state siting strategies, including ways by which states engage the public in siting
processes, and concludes with a critique of existing state siting models, arguing
both that these schemes may contribute to the disproportionate placement of
hazardous waste facilities in minority and poor communities and that the siting
models do not promote environmental equity. Part V presents
recommendations made by commentators to rectify environmental inequities
and provides a critique of these suggestions. Part VI discusses a proposed model
siting scheme that addresses environmental equity issues. The proposal utilizes
some of the recommendations discussed in Part V, and closes with a critique of
the proposed siting scheme. Finally, Part VII concludes that hazardous waste
facilities can be sited in a more equitable manner and that environmental equity
is a worthy and achievable goal.
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II. PHILOSOPHICAL AND MORAL BASIS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY
Part II discusses the philosophical and moral bases for environmental equity. It
begins with a general overview of three basic conceptions of equality: equality
of status or respect, equality of opportunity, and equality of result or outcome.
It then reviews the historical foundations of equality and morality in a
constitutional democracy and ends with a brief discussion of laws in the United
States that promote equality in various areas of society. I argue that the idea of
environmental equity is consistent with the spirit of these laws and that the
concept can be the basis for future policies on siting hazardous waste facilities.
A. Equality
Equality is the idea that alike things should be treated similarly. Aristotle
once said that "equality consists in the same treatment of similar persons."16
Human equality, therefore, is the similar treatment of alike individuals. Equality,
however, may refer to equality of status or respect, equality of opportunity, or
equality of final result or outcome.17
Equality of status or respect "has more to do with symbolic gestures than
material allocations."1 8 It presumes the total absence of discrimination or
arbitrary and unreasonable differentiation: equal treatment alone assures
equality. 19 As a basic concept of equality, however, equality of status or respect
is premised on the fiction that discrimination based on race and income does not
exist, consciously or subconsciously.
16DICTIONARY OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS: STUDIES OF SELECTED PIVOTAL IDEAS 139
(Philip P. Weiser ed., 1973) [hereinafter DICTIONARY OF IDEAS].
17ROBERT E. GOODIN, REASONS FOR WELFARE: THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE
WELFARE STATE 52 (1988).
181d.
1 9 BERNON VAN DYKE, EQUALITY AND PUBLIC POLICY 36 (1990).
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Equality of opportunity provides that all persons are subject to the same
standards and criteria in maximizing full use of their talents in life pursuits. It is
"what exists not only in the absence of discrimination but also in the absence of
any kind of disadvantage for which the government or society is responsible."20
Equality of opportunity does not account for those who need more resources
than others in order to be equal. 21 Those who are disadvantaged initially might
remain so throughout their lives, unable to compete with others more fortunate.
For example, physically disabled persons might require more resources than
individuals without such disabilities in order to compete equally.
Finally, equality of result or outcome requires taking shortcomings and
prejudices into account to effect equality in result or outcome. This third equality
acknowledges that some persons endure disadvantages for which they are not
responsible. For instance, they may have been "born into an economically and
culturally deprived home." Thus, in order to effect equality, "government (or
'society') must do what it can to make up for the disadvantages for which the
individual is not responsible."22 Equality of result tips the balance at some point
to compensate for inadequacies, thereby producing equal results.
Because no two individuals are alike, the concept of human equality
necessarily requires that differences in persons be accommodated, minimized, or
ignored altogether.23 Otherwise, differences in race, ethnicity, and sex, for
instance, could justify unequal treatment. In the United States there is a tendency
to disregard or compensate for immutable human characteristics, such as sex,
race, and physical disability. This tendency is based on principles of democracy
201d.
2 1DICTIONARY OF IDEAS, supra note 16, at 146.2 2VAN DYKE, supra note 19, at 36.
23DIcrIONARY OF IDEAS at 139.
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and equality inherent in the Declaration of Independence, the U.S. Constitution,
and concern for the public good.
B. Equality and Morality in a Constitutional Democracy
The Declaration of Independence indicates that the idea that "all men are
created equal" is a self-evident truth. The Preamble to the United States
Constitution outlines in general terms the purpose for the Constitution itself.
The Constitution begins with a mandate to "establish Justice," to "promote the
General Welfare," and to "secure the Blessings of Liberty" for present and future
generations. Because the Constitution embodies the ideals of the American
Revolution, which were expressed in the Declaration of Independence, the
Preamble may be seen as descriptive of the moral norm that "all men are created
equal."24
The Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, however, were
not written in a vacuum; the moral claim that "all men are created equal" has
origins that predate events leading to the founding of the United States. Hence,
the moral foundations of these documents come from several ideas of universal
equality, and not simply from capitalism, majority-rule democracy, or
freedom.25 In the Western tradition, these origins include Canon Law, Roman
Law, English common law, and the social contract theory.26
Briefly, Canon Law was based on the authority of God and a "duty 'to
love God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy strength, and
2 4 See JAMES H. RUTHERFORD, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: AN ANALYTICAL AND HISTORICAL INQUIRY INTO THE
PRIMARY MORAL CONCEFT OF EQUALITY 2 (1992) ("Federalists 39 also makes it clear that the
Constitution was meant to be compatible with 'the fundamental principles of the Revolution."'
(citations omitted)).25 1d. at 1.261d. at 8.
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will all thy mind, and thy neighbor as thyself."' 27 Equality among all persons
stemmed from the belief that man and woman were created by a single God and
in His image.28 Thus, all were equally God's creatures.29 In contrast, Roman
Law was premised on an apparent natural moral order in the universe in which
humans were equal.30 This moral order was understood by all because humans
had the ability to distinguish between right and wrong, or at least had the
potential to learn the differences. 31
Common law of the English feudal society retained its moral authority
from social custom and tradition.32 It is best described as a "communitarian
ethical system" where the governed common people themselves establish ethical
concepts and responsibilities over time.33 Social contract theory posits that an
individual in a "natural" and ungoverned state is concerned primarily with his or
her own well-being. The underlying assumption is that in an environment
where all are free and equal, there exist "natural rights" which may be
defended. 34
The unifying moral concept of equality in United States democracy
"integrates and balances these four ethical systems."35 The U.S. constitutional
democracy "accommodates and moderates" government rule by restricting the
powers of government and employing a system of checks and balances among
the three branches of government. 36 Significantly, the Constitution is "not a
2 7 d. at 8-9 (quoting Lev. 19:18; Deut 6:5; Lk 10:27; Mk 12:29-31).
2 8Id.at 8-9 (citing Gen. 1:27).
2 9DICT'IONARY OF IDEAS, supra note 16, at 138.
3 0RUTHERFORD, supra note 24, at 9; DICTIONARY OF IDEAS, supra note 16, at 140.3 1RUTHERFORD, supra note 24, at 9.
3 2 d. at 9.
3 31d. at 10.
34Id.
35d.
361d. at 22; see generally U.S. CONST. art. I-IV.
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blueprint for a hierarchical government based on intelligence, race, class, power,
tradition, or paternalism."37 Instead, the Constitution protects all citizens alike.38
In view of these ideals, federal legislatures have enacted laws providing
for "the common good" of all citizens in several arenas, including housing and
employment, during the history of the United States. In general, these laws have
served to promote equality of outcome or result in the respective areas they
cover, on behalf of groups that have endured a history of discrimination.
C. Federal Legislation and Equality of Outcome
The United States legislature has acted on behalf of minorities to eradicate
discrimination. These groups include Blacks and other racial minorities, women,
and disabled persons. Three examples of laws created to advance their rights are
the Fair Housing Act,39 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (employment
discrimination),40 and the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA).41 These laws
generally were enacted to eliminate discrimination and to provide standards of
enforcement. Moreover, as discussed below, they operate to produce equality of
outcome or result.
Through the Fair Housing Act, Congress believed that it could "eliminate
'racially discriminatory housing practices [and] ultimately [produce] residential
integration'. ... Thus, Congress saw the antidiscrimination policy as the means to
3 7RUTHERFORD, supra note 24, at 22.
3 8This view was shared by distinguished proponents of democracy: "All, too will bear in
mind ... that though the will of the majority is in all cases to prevail, that will to be rightful
must be reasonable; that the minority posses their equal rights, which equal law must protect,
and to violate would be oppression." Thomas Jefferson, First inaugural Address, March 4, 1801,
reprinted in SOURCES OF DEMOCRACY: VOICES OF FREEDOM, HOPE, AND JUSTICE 29 (Saul K.
Padover ed., 1973) [hereinafter SOURCES OF DEMOCRACY]; 'The foundation of the law, the
glory of the law, is that the weakest is equal to the strongest in matter of right and privilege,
and the goal to which we are constantly ... striving to go forward is the goal of actual equality,
of actual justice, upon the basis of equality of rights." Woodrow Wilson, From Address at San
Diego, California, Sept. 19, 1919, reprinted in SOURCES OF DEMOCRACY, supra, at 78.
39 Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1988).
4042 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1988).
4142 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (1990).
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effect the antisegregation-integration policy."42 The Fair Housing Act prohibits
discrimination because of race, color, or national origin in the sale or rental of
housing.43 A housing practice is unlawful not only if a violator acts with a
motive to discriminate, but also if the violator's discriminatory actions have a
disproportionate affect on a member of the protected class.44 In this manner, the
law promotes equality of result or outcome.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964, which included Title VII, was enacted at the
height of the civil rights movement of the 1960s. Title VII was the first extensive
campaign against employment discrimination on a nation-wide basis.45 The law
prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex,
and national origin.46 It similarly establishes an equality of outcome in the
workplace through disparate impact analysis. Pursuant to disparate impact
theory, a violation occurs when employment policies, regardless of intent, weigh
more heavily on one protected group than on another non-protected group and
have no demonstrable business relation.47
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) similarly was enacted out of
concern for equal treatment of disabled persons. The purpose of the act is to
provide a national dictate for the eradication of discrimination against disabled
persons. Like the Fair Housing Act and Title VII before it, the ADA defined
discrimination to include "employing standards, criteria or methods of
administration that have the effect of discrimination. ... A disparate impact
standard is incorporated to ensure that the legislative mandate to end
42 U.S. v. Starrett City Associates, 840 F.2d 1096, 1101 (2nd Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).
4342 U.S.C. § 3601 (1988).
44 Starrett City Associates, 840 F.2d 1100.
4 5MICHAEL J. ZIMMER ET. AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION 23-24 (2d ed. 1988).
4642 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988).
4 7E.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See generally ZIMMER, supra note
45, at 211-308.
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discrimination does not ring hollow."48 It addresses several areas: employment,
public services, public accommodations and services operated by private entities,
and telecommunications. 48a
These laws were enacted to eliminate discrimination in housing and the
workplace. They operate by promoting equality even if there is no evidence of
motive to discriminate: it is enough to show a disparate impact. The concept of
environmental equity -- or the equal distribution of environmental risks across
race, ethnicity and income -- promotes the same kind of results-oriented equal
treatment in the distribution of environmental risks, especially those associated
with hazardous waste facilities. To this end, environmental equity is consistent
with the spirit of laws enacted to bring about equality in outcome in other areas.
As the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has indicated, "environmental
equity is an important goal in a democratic society. It involves ensuring that the
benefits of environmental protection are available to all communities and an
environmental policy-making process that allows the concerns of all
communities to be heard, understood, and addressed."49 If, for example,
employment and housing in the U.S. can be influenced by policies to eliminate
unequal treatment, the same may be true for the distribution of hazardous waste
facilities.
48AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990: LAW AND EXPLANATION 17,30
(Commerce Clearing House Editorial Staff Publication 1990).
48a Americans With Disabilities Act titles I through IV.
49EPA EQUITY REPORT, supra note 13, at 2. Equity and equality, however, are different
concepts. Whereas "equality has to do with sameness of results, ... equity, or fairness, concerns
the relationship between one person's work or other effort and the reward for that effort, and
another person's effort and reward." HERBERT J. GANS, MORE EQUALITY 73-74 (1973). In the
context of environmental equity, however, equity carries the meaning of equality as noted by
Gans.
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Interest over the distribution of environmental risks associated with
hazardous waste facilities has been fueled by studies documenting the
disproportionate occurrence of these facilities in minority and poor communities
across the United States. These studies are discussed in Part III.
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III. RACE, INCOME, AND UNEQUAL DISTRIBUTION OF HAZARDOUS WASTE
FACILITIES
This part presents evidence showing a disproportionate incidence of hazardous
waste facilities in minority and poor communities. Two notable studies on the
unequal distribution of hazardous waste facilities are discussed and a critique is
set forth. This part also provides a discussion of public opposition to the siting of
hazardous waste facilities because some commentators argue that the opposition
has contributed to disparate siting practices. The conclusion of this part is that
there is convincing evidence to support the claim that hazardous waste facilities
are located disproportionately in minority and poor communities.
A. The Evidence
In 1983, the United States General Accounting Office conducted a study
(GAO Report) of racial and economic characteristics of communities surrounding
off-site landfills (those not part of an industrial facility) in EPA's Region IV. 50 The
objective of the study was to determine the correlation between the location of
hazardous waste landfills and the racial and economic status of surrounding
communities. 51
The GAO reviewed EPA files to determine the location of the off-site
landfills. Four hazardous waste landfills were identified, along with their
operators.52 The GAO gathered information about the communities around
50GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SITING OF HAZARDOUS WASTE LANDFILLS AND THEIR
CORRELATION WITH RACIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES 1
(1983) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. Region IV is comprised of the following eight states:
Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and
Tennessee.
5 1GAO REPORT, supra note 50, at 2.
52These were: 1) Chemical Waste Management, Sumter County, Alabama; 2) Industrial
Chemical Company, Chester County, South Carolina; 3) SCA Services, Sumter County, South
Carolina; and 4) the Warren County PCB landfill, North Carolina.
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these facilities using 1980 census data provided by the Bureau of the Census. The
GAO studied racial and economic data for census areas in which the landfills are
located and other census areas with borders within four miles of the facilities.
The Bureau of the Census also provided similar data for the county and state in
which the landfills are located.53
The Report found that of the four off-site hazardous waste landfills in
Region IV, three were located in communities where Blacks made up the
majority of the population.54 The Report also found that in all four sites, Blacks
in surrounding census areas had lower mean incomes that the mean income for
all races combined and represented the majority of persons below poverty level
in those areas as well.55 These findings are summarized in Table A.
Four years after the GAO reported its findings, the United Church of
Christs' Commission for Racial Justice published a study with outcomes
consistent with the GAO Report. The study, "Toxic Wastes and Race in the
United States: A National Report on the Racial and Socio-Economic
Characteristics of Communities with Hazardous Waste Sites" (Commission
Report) presented findings from two studies on demographic characteristics
related with commercial hazardous waste facilities and uncontrolled toxic waste
sites.56 For the purposes of this thesis, only the first study on commercial
hazardous waste facilities will be discussed.
5 3GAO REPORT, supra note 50, at 2-3.
5 4 1d. at 1.
55Id. at 3. The poverty level was $7,412 for a family of four in the 1980 census.
56The Commission Report identifies a "commercial hazardous waste facility" as any facility,
public or private, which accepts hazardous wastes from a third party for a fee. COMMISSION
FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, TOXIC WASTES AND RACE IN THE UNITED
STATES: A NATIONAL REPORT ON THE RACIAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF
COMMUNITIES WITH HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES xii (1987) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT].
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Table A: 1980 Census Population, Income, and Poverty Data for Census Areas Where
Landfills are Located.
POPULATION MEAN FAMILY POPULATION BELOW
INCOME POVERTY LEVEL
Landfill No. % Black All Races Blacks No. % %Black
Chemica aste 626 90 $11,198 $10,752 265 42 100
SCA Services 849 38 $16,371 $6,781 260 31 100
Industrial Chemical Co. 728 52 $18,996 $12,941 188 26 92
Warren County PCB 804 66 $10,367 $9,285 256 32 90
Landfill I _ _ _ __ _ _ _ I _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ f_ __ __I_ __ _ I
Source: General Accounting Office, Siting of Hazardous Waste Landfills And Their Correlation
With Racial and Economic Status of Surrounding Communities 4 (1983)
The study was conducted to determine whether variables of race and
socio-economic status were major factors in the location of commercial
hazardous waste facilities. Its objective was to determine whether there was a
relationship between the racial characteristics of populations and the location of
commercial hazardous waste facilities in the United States. One question
examined by the Commission was whether the racial composition of the
population was significantly different in communities with commercial
hazardous waste facilities than those without them.57
The Commission identified 415 operating commercial hazardous waste
facilities in the contiguous United States, as of May 1986.58 Because the
Commission also wanted to test the theory that there may be a significant
relationship between the size of commercial hazardous waste landfills and the
racial characteristics of populations living in the communities in which the
facilities are located, capacities of landfills were measured in terms of acre-feet.
5 7 1d. at 9.
5 8 The source of the information was the EPA's Hazardous Waste Data Management System,
which was verified with commercial hazardous waste directories. Id. at 10, (citing
ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION LTD., INDUSTRIAL AND HAZARDOUS WASTE
MANAGEMENT FIRMS. (1986)).
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The methodology of the study was a comparison of characteristics of
small geographic areas which may be "relevant to the location of commercial
facilities." The study contrasted five major variables in all areas of the United
States: "minority percentage of the population", "mean household income",
"mean value of owner-occupied homes", "number of uncontrolled toxic waste
sites per 1000 persons", and "pounds of hazardous waste generated per person".
Minority percentage of the population was used to gauge racial composition of
communities. Mean household income and mean value of owner-occupied
homes were used to determine whether socio-economic considerations are more
important than race in the location of commercial hazardous waste facilities.
Home values were used to determine the role of land values. The presence of
uncontrolled waste sites was considered to learn whether historic or geographic
factors are related to the location of commercial hazardous waste facilities in
ways unreported by other variables in the analysis, such as by land use, zoning,
and transportation access, or physical traits of the sites such as groundwater, soil
permeability and topography. The hazardous waste generation variable was
considered in order to see if there is a relationship between the location of
facilities and closeness of possible customers. 59
Residential ZIP code areas were separated into four (I through IV)
mutually exclusive groups. The first was created to distinguish communities
without commercial hazardous waste facilities from those with facilities.
Communities with one facility were divided into two categories: those with a
landfill and those with another type of hazardous waste facility. The fourth
group was created on the basis of an estimated measure of "greater commercial
59 1d. at 10.
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hazardous waste activity", that is, communities with several facilities or with one
of the United State's five largest landfills. 60 Table B summarizes these groups.
Table B: Commission Report Residential Groups
GROUP DESCRIPTION
I 5-digit ZIP code areas without operating commercial hazardous waste
treatment, storage and disposal facilities
II 5-digit ZIP code areas with one operating commercial hazardous waste
treatment, storage and disposal facility that is not a landfill
III 5-digit ZIP code areas with one operating commercial hazardous waste landfill
that is not one of the five largest
IV 5-digit ZIP code areas with one operating commercial hazardous waste
landfills or more than one treatment, storage and disposal facility
Source: United Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice, Toxic Wastes and Race in the
United States: A National Report on the Racial and Socio-Economic Characteristics of
Communities with Hazardous Waste Sites 11 (1987).
The Commission used five different statistical tests to reach findings
"independent of any single analytic technique." These tests were: discriminant
analysis, difference of means test, matched-pairs test, and non-parametric
versions of the difference of means and matched-pairs tests. Using these
statistical analysis, the Commission tested the following hypotheses:
1. The mean minority percentage of the population was a more
significant discriminator than the other variables for differentiating
communities with greater number of commercial hazardous waste
facilities and the largest landfills.
2. The mean minority percentage of the population was significantly
greater in communities with facilities than in those without.61
6 0 d. at 10-11.
6 1 d. at 11.
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The Commission tested these hypothesis "by comparing all communities and by
comparing communities with facilities to those without in the surrounding
county."62
The Commission found that areas with the highest number of commercial
hazardous waste facilities had the highest mean percentage of residents who are
members of a minority group. On the other hand, those areas with no waste
facilities had a lower proportion of minority residents.63 Figure A illustrates the
mean minority percentage of the populace in communities with the four groups
tested.
Figure A: Minority Percentage of the Population in U.S. Communities with Operating
Commercial Hazardous Waste Facilities
Percentage
50
45
40 37.6
35
30
25 23.72
20
15 12.3
10
5
I M V
Communities by Group (see Table B for description)
Note: Minority populations include: Blacks, Hispanics, Asian/ Pacific Islanders, American
Indians and other "non-White" persons.
Source: United Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice, Toxic Wastes and Race in the
United States: A National Report on the Racial and Socio-Economic Characteristics of
Communities with Hazardous Waste Sites 11 (1987).
6 21d.
6 3Id. at 13.
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Figure A also shows that in communities with one operating commercial
hazardous waste facility the mean minority percentage of the population was
about 24% whereas in communities without such facilities the minority
percentage was about half that, or 12%. In communities with two or more
operating commercial hazardous waste facilities or one of the five largest
landfills in the United States, the mean minority percentage of the population
(38%) was more than three times greater than the percentage of minorities in
communities without such facilities (12%).
Moreover, the analysis also showed that mean household income and the
mean value of owner-occupied homes were not as significant as the mean
minority percentage of the population in distinguishing residential ZIP codes
with lesser numbers of hazardous waste facilities compared to those with greater
numbers and the largest landfills (see Tables C and D). According to the
Commission Report and as indicated in Table C, the mean value of owner-
occupied homes in communities, though a significant discriminator (12.265), was
less so than the minority percentage of the population (51.393), even "[aifter
controlling for regional differences and urbanization."64
On the whole, the discriminant analysis tests showed that the minority
percentage of the population in relation to the existence of commercial
hazardous waste facilities was "statistically very significant." The percentage of
minorities in a community was a stronger predictor of the degree of commercial
hazardous waste "activity" than was household income, the value of homes, the
number of uncontrolled toxic waste sites or the estimated amount of hazardous
6 41d.
wastes generated by industry.65 These results are summarized in Tables C and
D.
Table C: Racial and Socio-Economic Variables Associated with the Location of Commercial
Hazardous Waste Facilities in the United States
(National Discriminant Analysis Statistics)
COMPARISON OF ALL COMPARISON OF
RESIDENTIAL ZIP CODE RESIDENTIAL ZIP CODE
AREAS AREAS WITH COMMERCIAL
(Degrees of Freedom = 3, FACILITIES WITH THEIR
35,400) SURROUNDING COUNTIES
(Degrees of Freedom = 3,
6516)
Variable F Statistic Prob. > F F Statistic Prob. > F
Minority Percentage of the 51.393 0.0001 17.291 0.0001
Population
Mean Household Income 12.265 0.0001 insignificant
Uncontrolled Toxic Waste 3.966 0.0079 insignificant
Sites per 1000 Persons
Mean Value Owner-Occupied insignificant 11.314 0.0001
Home
Pounds of Hazardous Waste insignificant insignificant
Generated per Person
Source: United Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice, Toxic Wastes and Race in the
United States: A National Report on the Racial and Socio-Economic Characteristics of
Communities with Hazardous Waste Sites 42 (1987).
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Table D: Operating Commercial Hazardous Waste Facilities Summary of National Statistics
DISCRIMIN DIFFERENCE OF MEANS TEST ZIP VS.
ANT COUNTY
ANALYSIS MEAN IN 5-DIGIT ZIP AREA FOR: MATCHED-
PAIRS TEST
Variablet Significance Group! GroupIl GroupIII GroupIV Difference of
Means
Minority Percentage of e 12.3 23.7e 22.0 37.6* 5.0e
Population
Mean Household Inc. e $23,718 $25711 *< $24,302 $23,749 -$2,745e
Uncontrolled Tox. Wst. e 0.269 0.980ee 0.725.* 0.432.. 0.828e
Sites/ 1000 Persons I
Mean Value Owner- NS $71,812 l81,436o. $76,34 $75,891 -$17,301.e
Occupied Home I
Lbs of Haz. Waste NS 3,379 8,001.e 198.. 7,022.. 6,585o
Generated / Person I I I
tVariables are listed in order of discriminant analysis significance.
Frequency of 5-Digit ZIP Code Areas and Facilities in Each Group
GroupI GroupII GroupIII GroupIV
Number of Residential ZIP Code Areas 35,380 310 18 41
(Total = 35,406)
Number of Operating Commercial 0 310 18 87
Facilities (Total = 415) _____
Legend
oo Significant with greater than 99 percent confidence. For the difference of means
test, this refers to the significance of the difference between the mean of a given
Group and Group I.
o Significant with greater than 90 percent confidence.
NS Insignificant in the discriminant analysis, that is, less than 90 percent confidence.
Group I 5-digit ZIP code areas without operating commercial hazardous waste treatment,
storage and disposal facilities.
Group H 5-digit ZIP code areas with one operating commercial hazardous waste treatment,
storage and disposal facility that is not a landfill.
Group III 5-digit ZIP code areas with one operating commercial hazardous waste landfill
that is not one of the five largest.
Group IV 5-digit ZIP code areas with one operating commercial hazardous waste landfills or
more than one treatment, storage and disposal facility.
Source: United Church of Christ Commission for Racial Justice, Toxic Wastes and Race in the
United States: A National Report on the Racial and Socio-Economic Characteristics of
Communities with Hazardous Waste Sites 41 (1987).
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According to the Commission Report, these findings "represented a consistent
national problem."66
Based on these findings, the Commission concluded that race has been a
consideration in the siting of commercial hazardous waste facilities in the United
States.67 The Commission also claimed that patterns of high incidences of
commercial hazardous waste facilities located in communities with greater
percentages of minorities is most likely not attributable to chance.68
In the face of rising concerns over the unequal distribution of hazardous
waste facilities, as documented by the GAO and Commission Reports, EPA
Administrator William K. Reilly created the EPA Environmental Equity
Workgroup in July of 1990.69 The objective of the Workgroup was "to assess the
evidence that racial minority and poor communities bear a higher environmental
risk burden than the general population [and to consider what the EPA might do
about any identified disparities]." The final report, published in June of 1992, was
"intended to contribute to the national dialogue on environmental equity and to
suggest further steps for the EPA."70 The Report noted six findings, of which one
indicated that minority populations experienced "higher than average exposures"
to pollutants in the air, hazardous waste facilities, contaminated fish, and
agricultural pesticides in the workplace. 71
Although the EPA Equity Report stated that exposure to pollutants and
other environmental risks does not always have a detrimental impact on human
66 1d. at xiii.
6 7 d. at xv.
6 81d. at xc. The Commission Report noted that the findings were statistically significant
with 99.99 % confidence. Id. at xv. The Commission further concluded that because the issue of
race is an important aspect of the problem of uncontrolled toxic waste sites, cleanup in Hispanic
and Black communities should be given highest priority.
6 9EPA EQUITY REPORT, supra note 13, at 2.
7 0 Id. at 3.
7 11d. at 3. Only the findings regarding hazardous waste facilities will be discussed.
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health, it indicated that high exposures do present "a clear cause for health
concerns." The Report explained that low income and minority communities
have a greater than average potential for exposure to pollutants because they
are inclined to live in areas with high levels of air pollution or are more likely to
live near a hazardous waste facility. 72
The EPA Equity Report described the findings of the GAO Report and the
Commission Report as testimony that minorities are more likely to live near
commercial hazardous waste facilities or uncontrolled hazardous waste sites than
the general population in the United States.73 Although the Equity Report used
these two reports to support its findings that poor and minority communities
experience unequal exposure to hazardous waste facilities, the EPA indicated that
"[ilt is clear that more study of this issue is required to fully understand the
association of race, income, and facility location."74
7 21d. at 12. Air pollution is mainly an urban phenomenon. For this reason, a higher
percentage of racial and ethnic persons are exposed to higher levels of air pollutants because
they live in metropolitan areas. Over 86% of Blacks and over 91% of Hispanics live in urban
areas. By comparison, only about 70% of Whites live in urban areas. Moreover, higher
percentages of Blacks and Hispanics live in areas deemed out of compliance with the Clean Air
Act (air non-attainment areas) by the EPA. The Report published findings of exposures to four
types of air pollutants. Over 14% of Whites were exposed to particulate matter, whereas over
16% and 34% of Blacks and Hispanics, respectively, were exposed to the same pollutant. Where
46% of Blacks and over 57% of Hispanics were exposed to carbon monoxide, only about 33% of
Whites were exposed. The same disparities exist in exposures to ozone, sulfur dioxide and lead.
Only over 52% of Whites were exposed to ozone in non-attainment areas, while over 62% of
Blacks and over 71% of Hispanics were exposed. As to sulfur dioxide, only 7% of Whites were
exposed, whereas over 12% of Blacks were exposed. EPA EQUITY REPORT, supra note 13, at 14,
The disparity between Hispanics and Whites in the sulfur dioxide category, however, showed
that Whites were at a disadvantage: only 5.7% of Hispanics live in such areas. Id. at 14.
Finally, over 9% of Blacks and over 18% of Hispanics live in non-attainment areas for lead,
compared to only 6% of Whites. According to the EPA Equity Report, efforts by the EPA to
improve air quality in non-attainment areas pursuant to the Clean Air Act of 1990 "should bring
significant benefits to racial minority groups." Id. at 12-14.
7 31d. at 14.
74Id. at 15. In 1992, The National Law Journal (Journal) published the results of a study on the
enforcement of federal environmental laws (Journal Study). The Journal examined the civil court
docket of the EPA and the agency's own record of performance at over 1000 Superfund toxic
waste sites. Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, Unequal Protection: The Racial Divide in
Environmental Law, THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, Sept. 21, 1992 at S2 [hereinafter Journal
Study].
Specifically, average penalties imposed in court for violation of the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act "vary dramatically with the racial composition -- but not wealth
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In spite of the need for hazardous waste facilities, residents in potential
and actual host areas have responded negatively to attempts to site facilities in
their communities. Public opposition to the siting of unwanted land uses such as
hazardous waste facilities is known by many as the NIMBY (not-in-my-
backyard) syndrome.75 Political pressures created by communities opposed to
-- of the communities surrounding the waste sites." At sites having the greatest White
population, penalties were 500% higher than penalties at sites with the greatest minority
population. Moreover, this disparity occurs by race alone and not income. The average penalty
in areas with the lowest median incomes is only three percent more than the average penalty in
areas with the highest income. Journal Study at S2.
The significance of the Journal Study is that the findings represent a financial aspect of
environmental risks borne disproportionately by racial and ethnic communities. Under federal
laws, financial penalties are imposed on violators to discourage them from polluting beyond
what is legally allowable. If the disincentive is removed, or comparatively less in a minority or
poor community, racial and ethnic communities are that much more at risk than their White
counter-parts.
Indirect evidence of unequal distribution of risks, across racial and socio-economic lines,
ranges from dramatic differences in health between Whites and minorities to discrepancies in
the enforcement of federal environmental laws. As the Commission Report indicates, there are
many studies documenting what it called "the social crisis occurring in Black and other racial
and ethnic communities" in the United States. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 56, at 15.
A study published by the Children's Defense Fund, for example, found that Black
infant mortality rates were twice as high as those for White children during the first year of life.
Children's Defense Fund, A CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND BUDGET: AN ANALYSIS OF THE FY
1987 FEDERAL BUDGET AND CHILDREN 319 (1986). In the U.S. Department of Health's Report
on Black and Minority Health, the report showed that there was a wide health gap between
minority and non-minority persons in the United States. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES, BLACK AND MINORITY HEALTH 4-5 (1985). The ratio of excess deaths to
total deaths in Blacks in the United States was 47.6% for males and females cumulative to age
45, and 42.5% for males and females cumulative to age 70. Id. at 5. These figures come from
the following six causes of death: heart disease and stroke, homicide and accidents, cancer,
infant mortality, cirrhosis, and diabetes. Id. "Excess deaths" represents the difference between
the number of deaths actually observed in a minority group (Blacks for the previous example)
and the number of deaths that would have occurred if that group had experienced the same
death rates for each age and sex as the White population. Id. at 63. When minority deaths are
higher than those of Whites, excess deaths will be a positive number; zero when they are equal;
and negative when the rates for minorities are lower than for Whites. Id. Thus the 47.2% and
42.5% figures show the dramatic differences in health of Blacks relative to that of Whites. In
summarizing these various reports, the Commission Report concluded that the disproportionate
negative effect of toxic waste on minorities was, in fact, part of a pattern consistent with the
findings of these other studies. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 56, at 15.
7 5 E.g., David Laws & Lawrence Susskind, Changing perspectives on the facility siting process,
MAINE POL. REV. 29, 29 (Dec. 1991); ROBERT D. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE,
CLASS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 4-5 (1990); Donna L. Kolar, Practical Advice for
Permitting a Waste Disposal Facility 4 NAT. RES. & ENVTL. 11, 11 (1989); MORELL & MAGORIAN,
supra note 3a, at 2-3.
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hosting facilities frequently has proven great enough to stop projects and may
have contributed to the results seen in the above reports.76
B. Public Opposition
Some commentators have argued that public opposition to hazardous
waste facilities has contributed to siting inequities.77 They argue that because the
search for a suitable facility site follows a "path of least resistance", communities
with little or no political initiative are especially vulnerable targets.78 Without the
technical or political sophistication and without financial resources, some have
argued, poor and minority communities are more attractive as sites than white
and affluent communities. For example, Robert D. Bullard alleges that "[m]ore
often than not [locally unwanted land uses] end[ ] up in poor, powerless, Black
communities rather than in affluent suburbs [(as a result of NIMBY)]. This
pattern has proven to be the rule .... Public officials and private industry have in
many cases responded to the NIMBY phenomenon using the place-in-blacks'-
backyard (PIBBY) principle."79
In general, local opposition is facilitated by three primary factors. The first
is the high amount of risk associated with hazardous waste facilities imposed on
host communities. 80 Because hazardous waste facilities provide most benefits to
parties remote to the communities in which they are sited, residents in host
76 According to the general counsel of CECOS International, Inc. (the hazardous waste
subsidiary of Browning-Ferris Industries), "[tihe NIMBY syndrome is in large measure
responsible for the waste disposal crisis in this country." Kolar, supra note 75, at 11.
77E.g., 2 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY:
REDUCING RISK FOR ALL COMMUNITIES 18 (1992); BULLARD, supra note 75, at 4-5; Robert D.
Bullard, Environmental Blackmail in Minority Communities, in ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS,
supra note 13, at 85; Rachel D. Godsil, Remedying Environmental Racism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 394,
396 (1991). See also Tsao, supra note 6, at 373 n.40.
7 8BULLARD, supra note 75, at xiv.
7 91d. at 5.
8 0Robert Cameron Mitchell & Richard T. Carson, Property Rights, Protest, and the Siting of
Hazardous Waste Facilities, 76 AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS 285, 287 (1986); Gail Bingham &
Daniel S. Miller, Prospects for Resolving Hazardous Waste Siting Disputes Through Negotiation, 17
NAT. RES. LAW. 473, 474-76 (1984).
Part III: Evidence of Unequal Distribution Page 35
communities see themselves as bearing an unfair amount of the burdens
associated with the facility. 81 The risks can appear as being imposed unfairly on
the community without their consent. 82 On the other hand, poor residents may
see a proposed siting facility as a means to gain employment. Thus, they may
find the risks outweighed by economic gains.
The second factor is the low cost of protesting. The siting controversy is
easily identifiable and protesters similarly are readily contacted because of the
local nature of a siting dispute.83 Also, public participation procedures in siting
processes present opportunities for opponents to stage protests and attract
media attention. For protestors, individual costs include time and money spent
on activities such as recruitment, fund raising, and organizing, on top of actual
protesting and writing letters. Moreover, "the time commitments necessary for
a successful protest movement are lumpy; only a relatively small number of
activists need to commit substantial amounts of time to the effort."84 Thus, for
most collaborators, participation is minimal. At the same time, however,
residents of a poor community may not necessarily have adequate time free to
participate even minimally.
Finally, the prospect of a successful protest campaign contributes to the
movement. Committed activists may find promoting their causes a fulfilling
endeavor, especially if they are able to gain wide-spread support and attract the
attention of the media and local elected officials.85 Additionally, opponents often
win:86 even if a project is not stopped at the local level, opponents attack siting
8 1 See, e.g., Laws & Susskind, supra note 75, at 35.
82 Mitchell & Carson, supra note 77, at 287; see Susskind, supra note 75, at 1-2.
83 Mitchell & Carson, supra note 77, at 287; see MICHAEL O'HARE ET AL., FACILITY SITING
AND PUBLIC OPPOSITION 8 (1983).
84Mitchell & Carson, supra note 77, at 287-88.8 5 d. at 288.
8 6 0'HARE, supra note 80, at 6.
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processes at the state level or challenge siting decisions in the courts. For poor
persons, however, expenses associated with extended protests and litigation are
cost prohibitive. For them, the chances for an effective drive against a siting
decision may be, or perceived to be, quite small.
Through NIMBY, residents have spared their communities from assuming
environmental risks associated with hazardous waste facilities. In the process
they have imposed costs on the disposal of hazardous wastes, encouraging
waste-producing industries to change pollution management from control to
reduction.87 On the other hand, NIMBY also has created a deficit in safe disposal
sites in some areas of the country88 and, some argue, has encouraged the siting
of facilities in areas with low or no NIMBY-type resistance.
NIMBY may be one factor contributing to inequities seen in the above
reports. Further research must be done, however, to verify the findings of the
reports, in view of limitations of each.
C. Critique and Suggestions for Further Research
The GAO Report is deficient in several respects. First, its findings are
limited only to EPA's Region IV. As such, the data set may be skewed and may
not accurately reflect regional patterns of where facilities are located. The study
also did not look into the reasons behind the the selection of the sites or examine
the population distributions of the area when the sites were established.89 The
8 7Cole, supra note 13, at 1996 (citing Calif. Dept. of Health Services, State and Industry Join
Together to Reduce Hazardous Waste (press release, Sept. 7, 1990) and BARRY COMMONER,
MAKING PEACE WITH THE PLANET 130-40, 178-90 (1991)).
88 Lawrence S. Bacow and James R. Milkey note that because enhanced federal government
regulations have compelled unsafe hazardous waste facilities to close and have raised the
quantity of waste that must be handled by off-site facilities, "legal disposal facilities have
become scarce in many regions [of the United States]." Overcoming Local Opposition to Hazardous
Waste Facilities: The Massachusetts Approach, 6 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 265, 266 (1982). They
note a shortage of environmentally suitable hazardous waste facilities and indicate that an EPA
estimate in 1977 showed a need for additional capacity of up to 1.7 million tons. Id. at 266 n.8.89 GAO REPORT, supra note 50, at 3.
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findings of the GAO Report may be reflecting demographic patterns that are
very different from patterns in existence at the time of the initial siting. Without
insight as to why the site was chosen, or what the demographics around the site
were, it is difficult to draw conclusions about how the unequal distributions came
to exist. The study also does not report the population distribution around the
landfills when the report was made, or how the racial and economic status of
host communities compared to others in the state.90 Without this information it
is unclear if there are disparities between racial and economic characteristics
relative to non-host communities throughout the state.
The Commission Report does not account for important factors as well.
For example, the study "was not designed to show cause and effect."91 It did not
consider the demographics of hazardous waste facility locations when they were
originally sited. The findings could reflect demographic changes around the
facilities. That is, the disproportionate incidence of hazardous waste facilities in
poor and minority communities as reported in 1987 could be the results of
changes in demographics since the time when the facilities were first located. For
instance, after the facilities were sited, property values around them could have
fallen thereby attracting classes of persons -- the poor and perhaps poor
minorities -- who could afford housing in the area. In fact, the two hypothesis
examined in the study tested only incidence of commercial hazardous waste
facilities at the time of the study and not when the facilities were originally
sited.92
9 01d.
9 1COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 56, at 11.
9 2For more on the shortcomings of the Commission Report, see Michael G. Terner, A
Geographic Information System (GIS) Assisted Approach for Assessing Environmental Equity in
the EPA RCRA Program's Site Inspecting Selection Process (1993) (unpublished Master of City
Planning thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology). Terner's thesis is a critique of existing
research on environmental inequities. He also provides suggestions for future research.
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Another weakness is that a national study such as the Commission Report
may be ineffective in showing regional differences in facility location trends.
Evidence showing disparities in the location of hazardous waste facilities in one
region where disparities are great, relative to other areas of the country, may
skew data and give a false impression that disparities are occurring in all areas of
the country. For example, one study of hazardous waste facilities in Suffolk
County, Massachusetts, found that they were located less often in minority
areas. 92a
Moreover, the Commission Report's focus on ZIP code areas may not
accurately represent the spatial realities of facility siting. For instance, a majority
White ZIP code area may contain a minority neighborhood in which hazardous
waste facilities are located. Under a ZIP code analysis, this example would
support a finding against the existence of environmental inequities in spite of the
location of facilities.in the poor and minority neighborhood. 92b
Given the shortcomings of both studies, future research should focus on
actual siting schemes and decision-making processes at the time the facilities
were sited. Studies should examine demographics, specifically race and income
data, of communities at the time when facilities were located. Using a
methological approach similar to the Commission Report, analysis of these data
could test the following hypothesis:
1) The mean minority percentage of the population at the time thefacilities
were sited was a more significant discriminator than other variables for
differentiating communities.
2) The mean minority percentage of the population was significantly
greater in communities with facilities at the time they were sited than in
those without.
92a Id. at 68.
92b See id. at 22-23.
fl.~.; ATI f r 1( T wr~ I'ithiin na;e3
"These hypotheses may be tested by comparing all communities and by
comparing communities with facilities [at the time the locations were chosen] to
those without in the surrounding county."93 Tests should be conducted at
national, regional (EPA regions) and state levels.93a
In spite of the faults of the GAO Report and the Commission Report, they
provide convincing evidence that hazardous waste facilities are located
disproportionately in poor and minority communities. Siting processes used by
the states may contribute to the inequity. Part IV explores this possibility.
9 3See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 56, at 11.
93a Another possible measure of environmental inequities is the allocation of resources to
address environmental equity issues. Michael Terner claims that a study of facility inspections
can be an appropriate test for environmental equity. He argues that geographic information
systems (GIS) and relational data base management systems (RDBMS ) are effective and
appropriate devices for determining the degree of environmental equity or inequities. He
proposes a promising methodology using GIS and RDBMS to examine census tract and
blockgroup data aggregations as a way to explore environmental equity issues. See generally
Terner, supra note 92.
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IV. EXISTING SITING MECHANISMS
Part IV begins with a discussion and critique of the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA). This statute is the primary federal law dealing with the
treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous waste. Part IV.B discusses various
siting mechanisms created and implemented by states. Part IV concludes with a
critique of existing state siting schemes, and argues that the state siting models
may contribute to the disproportionate incidence of hazardous waste facilities in
poor and minority communities.
A. Federal Response to Hazardous Wastes
Before the passage of RCRA in 1976, the majority of state management
programs were concerned primarily with solid waste. 94 There were, however,
five states with comprehensive hazardous waste management laws: California,
Illinois, Minnesota, New York, and Oregon.95 Yet in states that did regulate
landfill use there were no provisions requiring the separation of toxic from non-
toxic wastes.96 With no separate guidelines for handling toxic compounds, states
relied on a "rough and sometimes incorrect" understanding of their solid waste
statutes when overseeing hazardous waste management.97 This contributed to
many hazardous waste management problems: "even ... inadequate standards
in place were not followed. Generators either disposed of their wastes by the
roadside or gave their wastes to irresponsible transporters. Transporters
pocketed transportation fees and indiscriminately dumped their cargoes into the
9 4Duffy, supra note 3, at 762.
951d.
961d.
97Id.
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environment."98 It was against this backdrop that the U.S. Congress enacted the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.
1. RCRA
Described by many as a "cradle to grave" comprehensive program, RCRA
creates a tracking system that follows the transportation and disposal of
hazardous waste.99 The tracking system begins with hazardous waste
generators who are required to keep accurate records of quantities of hazardous
waste generated, and to label any containers used for the storage, transport or
disposal of wastes. 100 Generators also are to provide the chemical composition
of the hazardous waste to persons transporting, treating, storing or disposing
the waste.101
Transporters of hazardous waste also are subject to strict standards
established by RCRA. Transporters must keep accurate accounts of transported
waste, including source and destination.102 The waste is to be transported "only
if properly labeled" and "only to the hazardous waste treatment, storage, or
disposal facilities which the shipper designates ... to be a facility holding a permit
issued" in accordance with RCRA standards.103
Finally, owners and operators of hazardous waste treatment, storage, and
disposal facilities must comply with strict disposal standards. In addition to
9 81d. at 763.
9 9E.g., ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: A
CASEBOOK ON NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY 252 (1992); Bran D.E. Canter, Hazardous Waste
Disposal and the New Siting Programs, 14 NAT. RES. LAW. 421, 430 (1982). See also 42 U.S.C. §
6922 (standards applicable to generators of hazardous waste), § 6923 (standards applicable to
transporters of hazardous waste) and § 6924 (standards applicable to owners and operators of
hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities) (1988).
10042 U.S.C. § 6922(a)(1)-(2) (1988).
10142 U.S.C. § 6922(a)(4) (1988).
10242 U.S.C. § 6923(a)(1) (1988).
10342 U.S.C. § 6923(a)(4) (1988).
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requirements for a wide range of disposal techniques and waste types, 104 RCRA
outlines permit requirements for treatment, storage, or disposal of hazardous
waste. 105
Perhaps the most far-reaching component of RCRA is the definitions
section. For example, "hazardous waste" is defined as "a solid waste or
combination of solid wastes," which may "cause, or significantly contribute to an
increase in mortality" or illness, or "pose a substantial present or potential hazard
to human health or the environment when improperly treated, stored,
transported, or disposed of ...."106 The most comprehensive definition, however,
belongs to the term "solid waste:"
any garbage, refuse, sludge from a waste treatment plant, water supply
treatment plant, or air pollution control facility and other discarded
material, including solid, liquid, semisolid, or contained gaseous material
resulting from industrial, commercial, mining, and agricultural operations,
and from community activities ...."107
By definition, much of the waste by-products from many industries is regulated
by RCRA. RCRA also contains provisions allowing the EPA to undertake
"corrective actions" capable of stopping or correcting problems related to the
release of hazardous wastes into the environment. 108
In short, RCRA depicts an elaborate scheme to implement an ambitious
national policy. The policy indicates that "wherever feasible, the generation of
hazardous waste is to be reduced or eliminated as expeditiously as possible.
1 04 E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6924(b) (salt dome foundations, salt bed formation, underground mines
and caverns), §6924(c) (liquids in landfills), §6924(d) (prohibitions on land disposal of specified
wastes), §6924(e) (solvents and dioxins), §6924(f) (disposal into deep injection wells) (1988).
10542 U.S.C. § 6925 (1988).
10642 U.S.C. § 6903(5)(A)-(B) (1988).
10742 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (1988).
10 8 PLATER, supra note 99, at 252. See also 42 U.S.C. § 6912(c) (1988) ("In carrying out the
provisions of this chapter, the Administrator [of the EPA], and duly designated agents ... are
authorized to initiate and conduct investigations under the criminal provisions of this chapter,
and to refer the results ... to the Attorney General for prosecution ....").
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Waste that is nevertheless generated should be treated, stored, or disposed of so
as to minimize the present and future threat to human health and the
environment."109
Although RCRA is exhaustive in its coverage of hazardous waste, and
attempts to identify, follow, and document the life-cycle of hazardous waste, the
law is vague as to how disposal facilities are to be sited. Indeed, the law leaves
this task largely to the states. 110 Therefore, it is the states that must tailor their
programs to provide safe waste disposal facilities, consistent with RCRA's
national policy. 111
The states were left with the responsibility of siting hazardous waste
facilities for several reasons. First, the federal government, it was believed, was
too distant to meet sufficiently the particular needs of local communities.
Similarly, local public officials were "too emotionally involved and susceptible to
community pressures to accept facilities."1 12 Control at the state level
accommodates these two concerns.
Second, because state governments have a "broad yet unbiased
perspective," they could see beyond specific site areas to determine the total
impact of the proposed facility.113 Third, Congress always intended for the
states to be entrusted with the duty of implementing the national hazardous
waste management program.114 Finally, the states' traditional police power and
10942 U.S.C. § 6902(b) (1988) (national policy).
1 1 0Canter, supra note 99, at 430; Tsao, supra note 6, at 368; Godsil, supra note 77, at 401. See
Duffy, supra note 3, at 763.
f1 1 Godsil, supra note 77, at 401. See also 42 U.S.C. § 6902(b) (1988). Section 6929 of RCRA
allows states to establish hazardous waste programs that are more restrictive than the federal
minimum. 42 U.S.C. § 6929 (1988). See generally FIGHTING TOXICS: A MANUAL FOR
PROTECTING YOUR FAMILY, COMMUNITY, AND WORKPLACE 165-68 (Gary Cohen & John
O'Connor eds., 1990).
1 12Duffy, supra note 3, at 766-67.
1131d. at 767.
1 14 See Canter, supra note 99, at 433.
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land use control authority provide them with the wherewithal to develop and
enforce a site selection program.115
Still, the EPA provided states with three basic principles around which to
base siting programs. First, states should execute a technical evaluation of all
proposed sites before any single site is selected. 116 Second, site selection should
be conducted with public participation. Finally, states should ensure that site
selection processes are not encumbered by blanket local vetoes.117
Furthermore, the EPA recommended five management alternatives for
state hazardous waste management programs. The first, and most favorable
option, is the reduction of hazardous waste generation. Next in order of
preference is the separation and concentration of hazardous wastes. The third
option is the use of wastes in other manufacturing processes. The fourth
alternative is the destruction of hazardous wastes in special incinerators or
detoxification and neutralization. The fifth, and least favorable option, is the
disposal of hazardous wastes in secured landfills. 118
In spite of RCRA's ambitious goals, the law may contribute to
environmental inequities in several ways, as outlined below.
2. Critique of RCRA
Although the law has been criticized both for being under-119 and over-
regulative, its over-regulative aspects are especially problematic to poor and
1151d.
1 161d. (quoting U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, HAZARDOUS WASTE
FACILITY SITING: A CRITICAL PROBLEM 7 (SW-86) (1980)).
1 171d. A blanket local veto refers to the authority of a local government to outlaw the siting
of any unwanted facility within its jurisdiction.
1 18 d. (quoting OFFICE OF WATER AND WASTEWATER MANAGEMENT, U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTING AGENCY, SOLID WASTE FACTS: A STATISTICAL HANDBOOK
8 (SW-694) (1978)).
11 9More than half of the country's hazardous waste lies beyond the law's regulatory system,
in spite of RCRA's broad definitions. PLATER, supra note 99, at 937. For example, domestic
sewage is not considered solid waste even though the sewage may contain other waste material
from publicly owned treatment works, legal point source discharges, irrigation return flows,
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minority communities near hazardous waste facilities because of "unintended
results."120 For instance, Dr. Robert Powitz, Director of Environmental Health
and Safety at Wayne State University, stated that:
[w]aste acids can often be combined in a chemical reaction with waste
bases to form salt and water. If performed, this reaction would eliminate
the need for transport of two hazardous substances, having changed
them to non-hazardous materials. To do so, however, is to perform
treatment under RCRA which requires the treater to obtain a [treatment,
storage, and disposal (TSD)] license that the University cannot afford to
obtain.... The alternative is to ship the hazardous material 80 miles
through several heavily populated areas to a licensed TSD facility. A
major chemical facility in the suburbs of Detroit, Michigan produces
isocyanate (of Bhopal infamy) as a by-product of plastics production.
Isocyanates react readily with water to produce non-toxic by-products.
Again, however, to combine them with the water is to engage in
treatment and requires a TSD license that the chemical company does not
want to obtain (...). The lawful disposal requires shipment of isocyanate
through residential areas in the vicinity of the plant and highway travel to
a facility some 60 miles away."121
and elements controlled by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (the term 'point source' means any
discernable, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch,
channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal
feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be
discharged." Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1988)). Moreover, EPA
regulations applicable to solid wastes such as household waste and agricultural wastes used as
fertilizers are much more lenient than those pertaining to other hazardous wastes. PLATER,
supra note 99, at 931. Other "special wastes", such as high volume, low toxicity material, cement
kiln dust, and particular coal and fuel combustion by-products such as fly ash, are subject to
exemptions as well. See 42 U.S.C. § 6921(b)(2)-(3) (1988). For these categories of special wastes,
the EPA is obligated to determine whether the exemption from the more rigorous regulations is
warranted. Until the EPA establishes that the special wastes should be subject to more
restrictive measures, the special wastes are treated as non-hazardous solid waste. PLATER,
supra note 99, at 931. These exemptions leave many dangerous and potentially dangerous
wastes unregulated by federal law, although state laws may regulate such wastes.
Nevertheless, coverage beyond what is federally mandated is entirely up to the states; not all
states may have laws dealing with these wastes.12 0 PLATER, supra note 99, at 938.
12 1 1d. (quoting Dr. Powitz).
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These examples demonstrate how RCRA can over-regulate, thereby defeating its
purpose of increasing safety and reducing waste. Moreover, the examples show
how such over-regulation puts at greater risk those communities surrounding
hazardous waste facilities. To the extent that there are disproportionate
numbers of such facilities in minority and poor communities, the dangers
described by Dr. Powitz only exacerbate environmental inequities.
Perhaps the greatest drawback to RCRA is its "mind-numbing"
complexity. 122 Determining whether a certain substance is controlled by RCRA
often is difficult because of the "definitional nightmares" inherent in the complex
law. To make matters worse, the EPA rules that track the wastes as they
progress through the different phases of generator, treatment, storage, and
disposal, are similarly as involved.123 The elaborate mechanism leaves much
room for error, possibly exposing many host communities to dangers posed by
uncontrolled or improperly handled hazardous wastes.
Although the reasons why Congress preferred to leave siting decisions up
to states are valid, the downside is that the policy's success rests on the efforts of
fifty individual states.124 Whereas some states may have the financial, technical,
and political resources to create effective siting programs others may not. The
result may be reflected in the relative elaborateness -- or lack thereof -- of
different siting programs. 125 Also, not all states may share the same concern for
environmental equity.
1 22 1d. at 928 (quoting American Mining Congress v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1177, 1189 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (Stan, J., writing for the majority)).12 3Id. at 939.
12 4 Canter, supra note 99, at 433.
12 5 For example, Florida's siting program occupies just over one page in the state's law
books. By comparison, Colorado's State Hazardous Waste Siting Act covers about 16 pages of
similarly-sized text.
Part TVs Ivir-finov Siting Mechanisms ae4
Though there is some benefit in allowing the individual states to serve as
laboratories for siting programs, thus far the results may be partially responsible
for the unequal distribution of hazardous waste facilities. Various states siting
models will be discussed next.
B. Generic State Siting Mechanisms
In general, states approach the siting of hazardous waste facilities from
one of three approaches: super review, site designation, and local control.
Additionally, some states require that developers compensate host communities
for accepting the facilities. Either way, the statutes assume the facilities are
necessary to society and must be sited "with as little social cost (including
environmental cost) and disruption as possible."126 Table D summarized the
basic concepts behind the different models to be described.
Table E: Summary of Basic Concepts of Existing State Siting Models
SUPER REVIEW SITE DESIGNATION LOCAL CONTROL COMPENSATION
MODEL MODEL
State regulatory State creates an Local land use State or developer
agencies await the inventory of preferred regulations are not offers inducements to
filing of a permit sites instead of preempted by state host communities to
application by a responding to hazardous waste offset costs associated
developer before developer's selections. management plan. with facility. Intention
considering viability States have a greater Thus, local is to eliminate local
of sites, ability to influence community can ratify opposition by making
geographic strict land use controls community better off
distribution of sites. to keep out facilities.ytoinfluen
1. Super Review Model
The super review approach is the most common.127 It calls for
regulatory agencies to await the filing of permit applications before determining
12 6 PLATERp supra note 99, at 954.
12 7 See Canter, supra note 99, at 438-43 for a full discussion of super review model. Other
examples of the super review approach include the following state statutes: CONN. GEN. STAT.
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whether a particular site is qualified for the intended use. The petition for permit
is evaluated according to a set of rules and either satisfied as filed, satisfied with
conditions, or denied. Under the super review scheme, if a permitting agency
denies a permit on grounds that the site is unsuitable, the developer is compelled
to give up or re-attempt with another site.128 Michigan is one state that follows
the super review siting model, and will be used to explain how this kind of
process is envisioned.
The Michigan siting scheme contains typical characteristics of the super
review approach. The program calls for an initial review of the permit
application by the state environmental protection agency. If the application
clears this initial hurdle, it is then reviewed for final determination by a specially
created site review board. Public participation is expanded during the time the
permit application is under review by the board. The program also provides for
the reconciliation of state and local interests in instances where concerns are
raised by interested parties.
In Michigan, the site permitting process begins when the director of the
State Department of Natural Resources (director) refers a construction permit
application to a site review board.129 The site review board consists of nine
voting members and a non-voting chairperson. 130 Seven members of the board,
who are appointed by the governor, include a geologist, a chemical engineer,
and a toxicologist, a representative from a "manufacturing industry", two
ANN. §§ 22a-117 through -124 (West 1985); IND. CODE ANN. §§13-7-8.6-1 through -12 (Bums
1990 & Supp. 1993); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3734.05 (Baldwin 1993); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
144.44 (West 1989 & Supp 1992).
128Canter, supra note 99, at 438.
1 29 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 299.517(1) (West 1984 & Supp. 1993). If more than one
construction permit application for interrelated facilities in a single site within the same
municipality are submitted, only a single siting board is established to review the site
applications concurrently. Final approval, however, is made or denied for each application
individually. Id.
130§ 299.517(2).
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"representatives of the public", and a representative of a municipality in which
the proposed facility is to be constructed upon approval. 131 The remaining two
positions are filled by a person appointed by the municipality in which the
proposed facility is to be sited. The other member is assigned by the county
board of commissioners in which the facility is to be constructed. Finally, an
attorney appointed by the governor serves as the non-voting chairperson. 132
By statute, a treatment, storage, or disposal facility cannot be built in
Michigan without a construction permit. The person proposing to construct such
a facility is responsible for making the permit application. The application itself is
to contain information including the location of the proposed facility. 133 The
application also is required to contain a disclosure statement with information
about the owners and operators of the facility. 134 Finally, the application is to
include a copy of a newspaper notice published at least thirty days before the
application's submission.135
After the director receives an application for a construction permit, and
after the director notifies the board, reviews the proposed plans, and holds a
131§ 229.517(2)(a).
132§ 229.517(2)(b).
133§ 229.518(3). There is also a required application fee. It is determined by a fee schedule,
included in the statute. Additionally, there is a $25,000 "revolving fund" fee, intended to cover
the expenses associated with the site review board. § 229.518(8).
13 4Such information would include the full name and address of the applicant; five persons
holding the largest shares of the proposed facility; the operator and three employees of the
operator "who will have the most responsibility for the day-to-day operation of the facility"; and
any business entity with more than a 25% share of the facility; all convictions for criminal
violations of any federal, state, Canadian, or provincial environmental law for each person listed
in the disclosure statement; an accounting of all environmental permits or licenses issued by a
federal, state, Canadian, or provincial agency held by each person listed in the disclosure
statement; and a listing of activities at property owned or operated by each person noted in the
disclosure statement "if the incident resulted in a threat or potential threat to the environment
§ 299.518(4)(a)-(d).
135 The published notice is supposed to contain a map noting the location of the proposed
facility, along with basic facts about the facility's characteristics and size. § 299.518(9). The
notice also is to contain a description of the review process, the location where the application
can be studies, and how one can obtain copies of the application. § 299.518(9)(a)-(c).
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public hearing, the director refers the application to the site review board.136 If
the director chooses to deny the application prior to the board's review, the
director must subject the application to a "public participation process."137 After
the public participation process, the director either can deny the permit or refer
the application to the review board for further consideration.
If the director decides to refer the application to the board, the board is to
meet to establish a date for a public hearing. The date, along with pertinent
information such as a map noting the location of the proposed facility, are
published in a local newspaper.138 At the scheduled public meeting and for
fifteen days thereafter, written or oral comments are accepted. Once the public
hearing comment period has ended, however, the board is to list "issues that are
to be addressed through a negotiation process and list the issues to be evaluated
by the board through its deliberations." 139 Mediation between the applicant and
affected parties identified by the board also is an option.140
If negotiations between the applicant and affected parties identified by the
board are conducted, the statute provides guidelines. First, the negotiation
process is to occur at the same time as the board's hearing process. Second, the
negotiations are to address both the issues referred by the board and those
issues selected by the applicant and all affected parties. Finally, the law stipulates
that negotiations are to be completed within 150 days after the first meeting of
136§ 299.519(1)-(2).
137§ 299.519(5).
138§ 299.520(3)(a).
139§ 299.520(5). "A negotiation process shall take place between the applicant and the
affected parties who shall be identified by the board. A representative of the municipality and
a representative of the county in which the facility is proposed to be located shall each be
considered an affected party. If requested by any affected party or the applicant, the board
shall appoint a mediator to assist during negotiations." § 299.520(6).
14
"If requested by any affected party or the applicant, the board shall appoint a mediator
to assist during negotiations." § 299.520(6).
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the board. 141 If the parties cannot reach a negotiated settlement on any of the
issues, the board can select among the final best offers.
Issues that are in dispute but not under negotiation are subject to formal
or informal hearings. At these hearings evidence may be presented by any
affected party.142 The board, however, determines which affected parties can
participate in the formal hearings. An affected party denied permission to
participate must receive notice of the board's decision along with reason why the
request was denied. The formal hearing process itself is to receive sworn
testimony, allow for the cross-examination of witnesses, allow representatives of
affected parties to cross-examine witnesses, and request participation "as
needed."143 Statements delivered at informal hearings, however, are not done
so under oath, nor are cross-examinations allowed.
Finally, the board is to consider the impact of the proposed facility on the
municipality in which it is to be sited, and reach a final decision on the
construction permit application. The board is to focus on several factors,
including the risk and impact of mishap during the shipment of hazardous waste
and the impact on the municipality where the planned facility is to be sited, with
respected to "health, safety, cost, and consistency with local planning and existing
development."144 Additionally, the board is to take into account the "concerns
141§ 299.520(6)(a)-(c). The applicant may, however, request an extension of not more than
60 da s.
1 § 299.520(8)-(9).
143§ 299.520(9)(a)-(d).
144§ 299.520(12)(d). Other considerations include the risk and impact of contamination of
ground and surface water by way of leaching and runoff; the risk of fires or explosions resulting
from incorrect treatment, storage, or disposal techniques. Toward this end, the board is to
consider local ordinances, permits, or other requirements and their possible relationship to the
potential facility. Another consideration is the characteristic of the possible environmental
impact, "including the specification of the predictable adverse effects on the following:" the
natural environment and ecology; public health and safety; scenic, historic, cultural, and
recreational value; water and air quality; and wild life. §299.520(12)(e)(i)-(iv). Another factor is
a determination of a means to allay harmful effects. The last is the consideration of information
in the construction permit application disclosure statement. § 299.520(12)(a)-(g).
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and objections" presented by the public. The board is allowed to change the
construction permit application to reflect its findings and is required "to the
fullest extent practicable integrate by stipulation the provision of the local
ordinances, permits, or requirements."145
If the board approves the permit, the final decision is released in the form
of a draft construction permit. The draft permit, in turn, is subjected to a process
of public participation. Upon completion of the participation process, the
director is to review the comments and revise and issue the permit.146
2. Site Designation Model
The site designation approach is characterized by the selection of
preferred sites around the state in advance of project proposals. In this manner,
an inventory of sites is maintained even during periods when no project
proposals are submitted by developers. An example of the site designation
model is the Minnesota siting program. 147
Under the Minnesota siting scheme, potential sites are selected in one of
two ways. First, a developer may propose a candidate site with approval from
the owners of the site and the municipal government in which it lies.148 Second,
the state may select potential sites, although it may designate no more than one
site per county.149
Any county containing a potential site may negotiate a contract with the
state's office of waste management once it files a resolution of interest (to host a
145§ 299.520(13).
146§ 299.520(16). The director also may reconvene the board to consider issues raised
during the public participation process. If, however, the board rejected the application, the
reasons for rejection are to be stated in writing, along with changes necessary to make the
application acceptable if a new application is made. § 229.520(17)(a).
147Another example of the site designation approach is Maryland. MD. NAT. RES. CODE
ANN. § 3-710 (Supp. 1991).148MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115A.21(1a) (West 1987 & Supp. 1993).
149§ 115A.21(1).
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facility) with the state's waste management board. The county, however, can
withdraw the resolution of interest at any time prior to executing a final
contract. 150 Contracts are subject to several negotiable terms, as noted in the
statute. For example, the state and county can negotiate the procedures
pertaining to the evaluation and selection of the site, and the construction,
operation, and maintenance of a proposed facility. The parties can negotiate
guidelines for safe operation of the facility and a compensation package. Finally,
the county can negotiate provisions for amending the contract and for resolving
disputes. 151
While the board and county are negotiating an agreement, the board
simultaneously seeks a private developer to build and operate a facility on the
site.152 Also, before a contract between the state and county can be executed, the
state office of waste management must prepare a report on the development of
the proposed facility. The report must include information such as a conceptual
plan describing and evaluating the proposed design and an assessment of
available technologies that can reduce the threat of hazardous waste releases. 153
In determining which site is suitable for a proposed facility, Minnesota law
calls for the consideration of at least several specific factors. First, the office is to
consider the "economic feasibility" of the sites, including the proximity of
generators of hazardous waste. The second consideration is the "intrinsic
suitability" of the site. Third, the office must take account of federal and state
pollution control and environmental protection rules. Fourth, the office must
150§ 115A191(2).
151§ 115A.191(5)(a)-(e).
152PLATER, supra note 99, at 955.
153 Other information includes "procedures and standards" for running the facility that
require recycling and reduction of hazardous waste;; an analysis of preferred physical
characteristics of an ideal site; a determination of the "feasibility of an interstate, regional
approach to the management of hazardous waste"; and an economic analysis of the
development and operation of the facility. § 115A.193(a)-(h).
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weigh the risk and impact for local residents, government, and public health,
safety, and welfare. 154 The office also is to consider the extent to which the
facility conforms with existing local land use laws and development, and adverse
effects on agriculture and natural resources. Additionally, the statute indicates
that so long as real property is intrinsically suitable to be used as a site, it may
not be excluded from consideration.
Finally, the board makes the decision on which site to construct a facility.
All sites not selected are no longer considered candidate sites.155
3. Local Control Model
Under local control siting schemes, local land use regulations are not
preempted by state siting programs. Thus, a local government can employ
tough land use regulations to restrict siting of facilities within its jurisdiction.
Colorado is one state with a siting scheme that follows the local control
model.156
The Colorado siting scheme, known as the "State Hazardous Waste Siting
Act," was enacted to provide "safe sites with adequate capacity for the disposal of
hazardous waste."157 The Act stipulates that any person wishing to operate a
hazardous waste disposal facility must first obtain a "certificate of designation"
from the county in which the proposed facility is to be sited.158 Once a county is
informed of such a proposal, it must notify other counties or municipalities
within twenty miles of the proposed site.
154This includes threats of accidental releases during transportation, fire, and explosion.
155§ 115A.28(1).
156Florida also operates a siting program that follows the local control model. Local control,
however, is not absolute in Florida because the governor and state cabinet can grant a variance
from local ordinances or regulations thereby allowing a facility to be sited. FLA. STAT. ANN. §
403.723 (West 1993).
157COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-15-200.1 (short title); § 25-15-200.2(1) (West 1990).
158§ 25-15-201(1).
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The proposed site is then subjected to a geological survey to determine
whether it is suitable, based on the "geological, hydrological, climatological,
geochemical and geomorphological" traits of the site. 159 The application itself is
deliberated by the county or municipal government at a public hearing after the
state makes a recommendation as to whether the site should be approved. 160
Consistent with the local control siting model, the county or municipality
has the final authority to approve or deny the application. Approval, however,
is granted only after several factors are met. First, the state must recommend
that the application be ratified. Also, the county or municipality must find that
the site will not threaten public safety. Toward this end, the density of the
population in communities surrounding the site and next to delivery roads
within fifty miles of the proposed site and the risk of accidents during transport
are taken into consideration. In addition, the applicant must show a need for the
facility and demonstrate the financial capability to operate the facility.
Furthermore, the applicant must establish "sufficient reliability, expertise, and
competency to operate and manage the proposed facility."161 Finally, the site
must comply with land use regulations. 162 If these factors are met, the county or
municipality may approve the application.
4. Compensation and Incentives Model
In an effort to eliminate local opposition to hazardous waste facility
sitings, some states have incorporated compensation mechanisms into siting
laws. Under such mechanisms, a package of inducements would accompany a
proposed facility. The rationale behind the compensation approach is that if
159§ 25-15-202(4)(b).
160§ 25-15-202(4)-(5).
161§ 25-15-203(e).
162§ 25-15-203(a)-(f).
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incentives to accept the facility outweigh local costs, such as health and
environmental risks, a community more likely would accept the siting of a
facility in its neighborhoods. 163
Compensation usually is determined in one of three ways. First, it can be
a function of the facility's gross receipts or amount of wastes processed.
Alternatively, compensation can be based on a standard tax or fee. Finally, a
compensation package can contain a number of inducements agreed upon
through negotiations between developers and host communities.
The state of Connecticut, for example, employs a compensation
mechanism in which the amount of compensation is based either on a certain
monetary value per standard unit of waste,164 in accordance with predetermined
values provided by the statute, or on negotiated incentives. 165 These negotiated
incentives may include payment to adjoining landowners for a drop in property
values; the purchase of a "green belt buffer" around the proposed facility;
provision of open space or recreational facilities for the municipality; purchase of
public safety equipment; payment of road repair costs (produced by increased
use of local roads); creation of access routes to the proposed facility; or direct
financial payments. 166 In any event, the negotiated incentives may not exceed
the amount established by the per unit or predetermined values described
earlier.167
Colorado law similarly provides for fees as reimbursement for costs
associated with a proposed facility:
163Bacow & Milkey, supra note 88, at 275; Bingham & Miller, supra note 80, at 478-79
("Direct compensation ... to offset the concentrated local costs of hazardous waste facilities
appears to be a promising approach .... The rationale for compensation is threefold: pragmatic,
equitable, and efficient.").164CONN. GEN. SrAT. ANN. § 22a-128(b)(1) (West 1985).
165§ 22a-128(a), (c).
166§ 22a-128(c).
167§ 22a-128(a),
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[a]ny hazardous waste disposal site which is issued a certificate of
designation ... shall be required... to pay to the county or municipality in
which it is located an annual fee for the purpose of offsetting the
estimated direct costs of increased state, county, and municipal services
created by the hazardous waste disposal site, including ... the
improvement and maintenance of roads and bridges, fire protection, law
enforcement, monitoring by county and municipal health officials, and
emergency preparation and response. 168
Colorado calls for the amount to be based on a percentage of the facility's annual
estimated gross revenue.
Minnesota also provides for compensation. Under Minnesota law,
negotiated terms of a contract (required for siting a facility) involve services or
benefits. Such benefits may include items such as those indicated in the Colorado
and Connecticut statutes. Minnesota law also contains a clause indicating that
compensation may fall into a broad category promoting the "health, safety,
comfort, and economic development and well-being of the county and its
citizens."169
16 8 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-15-214 (West 1990).16 9 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115A.191(5)(c) (West 1987 & Supp. 1993).
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Part of most state siting schemes are devices to promote public
participation. As discussed next, participation by residents of potential host
communities may promote consensus and trust, and may add legitimacy to
siting processes.
C. Public Participation and State Siting Schemes
As a way to inform better residents of host communities of hazardous
waste facility proposals to reduce local opposition and build consensus, many
state siting programs use public participation mechanisms. These mechanisms,
discussed below, are implemented to engage mainly local residents and not the
state-wide public.170 Public participation also is used to "legitimize" the site
selection process in the eyes of the public and to reduce public opposition by
giving local residents a chance to partake in the process. 171
One technique states use to enhance public participation is the
appointment of temporary members from the host communities to a state siting
board.172 Such local membership advances the fairness of the siting process and
mitigate local opposition by giving local communities a voice on the state siting
board. Siting programs also engage the public by using administrative hearings
open to the public and to interested persons. Public comments and objections
received at such hearings are taken into account when making final decisions. 173
Public participation also is enhanced through the creation of local siting
1 70 Canter, supra note 99, at 451.
1 71 Duffy, supra note 3, at 777; see A. Dan Tarlock, Siting New or Expanded Treatment, Storage,
or Disposal Facilities: The Pigs in the Parlors of the 1980s, 17 NAT. RES. LAW. 429, 452-56 (1984).
Tarlock discusses six models of public participation appropriate for the siting of hazardous waste
facilities. The models are 1) minimum formal public participation; 2) enhanced formal public
participation; 3) enhanced formal participation in a planning process that precedes regulatory
decisions; 4) formal due process; 5) direct electoral participation; and 6) interest representation in
mediation and arbitration processes. Id.
1 72 E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 13-7-8.6-4(a) (Burns 1990 & Supp. 1993); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 299.517(2)(a) (West 1989 & Supp. 1993).
1 73 Canter, supra note 99, at 451.
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boards. 174 Through local siting boards state siting programs engage greater
numbers of local participants within a more formal review structure. Moreover,
local siting boards help reduce difficulties related to regulating from greater
distances. Local interests can be heard and responded to with greater efficiency
and with more reliability than if the board were based at a state capital perhaps
many miles away and with fewer interests in common with the local
community. 175
Yet another way states promote public participation is by providing
technical assistance grants 176 The purpose of these grants is to eliminate
financial and technical barriers that would otherwise keep potential host
communities from participating meaningfully in the siting process. These grants
would supply local site review boards and other public officials and interested
parties with adequate resources to study siting proposals. With greater access to
technical information and expertise, it is hoped that local communities would be
able to make informed decisions and actions regarding proposals to site a
hazardous waste facility in their community.
In summary, states try to legitimize siting processes by giving local
residents some opportunity to influence the final selection through public
participation mechanisms. It is hoped that public opposition will be reduced if
host communities perceive siting decisions as partly their own. Furthermore, a
community that believes that its comments and concerns are both heard and
factored into the site selection process may be more likely to accept risks
associated with the hazardous waste facility. Even if a community lacks the
1 7 4 E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-127(a) (West 1985) (local project review committee);
MISS. CODE ANN. § 17-18-35 (Supp. 1993).
17 5 Canter, supra note 99, at 451-52.
17 6 E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-127(b) (West 1985); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-
15-103 (West 1990).
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resources to partake in the siting process, many states provide technical
assistance grants to ensure adequate means.
With respect to environmental equity and the siting of hazardous waste
facilities, however, the state siting schemes are problematic because they do not
promote the equal distribution of such facilities across race, ethnicity and income
groups. Indeed, state siting programs were not designed with environmental
equity in mind. Some of the drawbacks of the state siting schemes outlined are
discussed below.
D. Critique of State Siting Schemes
To the extent that hazardous waste facilities are found disproportionately
in minority and low income communities, state siting processes may contribute
to this inequity. Each of the four approaches is problematic because it fails to
consider factors that promote environmental equity.
Although the super review model employs special siting boards that are
supposed to instigate informed debate over the siting process and provide for
local participation, most siting statutes have preemption clauses.177 Thus, even if
a potential host community opposes a proposed facility, the siting board can
elect to ignore the opposition. Also, the fact that private developers choose sites
undermines the perception of fairness: a developer with a cost incentive
typically would choose a site with lower land values. These sites might be
located in poor sections of a community, where minority and poor persons tend
to live. Even if local land use laws are preempted by state siting statutes,
opponents to a facility can defeat the proposal using other methods, such as
litigation, political pressure, or civil disobedience. 178 Hence, if developers learn
177Canter, supra note 99, at 450. See also Godsil, supra note 77, at 406.
17 8 Godsil, supra note 77, at 405. See infra Part V discussing these techniques.
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that the super review siting model is prone to failure under local opposition, they
might be encouraged to find communities less willing or able to oppose a facility.
The path of least resistance could lead to a poor or minority community.
Like the super review approach, the site designation model is also
susceptible to local opposition. Communities still may be able to keep their sites
off candidate site lists during preliminary site selection processes. Where
counties can volunteer sites, communities may submit those sites they believe
either are unsuitable or are within politically powerless communities. In this
manner, counties either could lower their chances of hosting a facility or could
control where within its borders a facility would be located, perhaps in a
politically powerless community. Additionally, although state officials act on
behalf of the public in serving their roles in the state government, they must also
respect economic factors. Just as private developers in the super review model
are attracted to inexpensive property, states similarly may prefer to minimize
siting costs by siting facilities on low-cost land.179 Although state governments
are public institutions with access to public funds, these resources are limited.
Therefore states have the same incentive to maximize financial resources by
siting facilities on inexpensive land.
The local control siting model is especially vulnerable to local opposition.
Like the super review and site designation approaches, local officials similarly
would be inclined to site facilities on inexpensive land. By definition, this siting
model acts on the wishes of a local community: if the community does not want
to host a facility or has local land use laws incompatible with a facility, the state
must look elsewhere for a site. Economic cost considerations, once again, would
179Cole, supra note 13, at 1993. Cole states that "[iun this era of government insolvency,
states will certainly be considering land values of potential hazardous waste sites. 'Profit' will,
in fact, motivate -- cost conscious states will replace 'cost conscious developers"'. Id. (quoting
Godsil, supra note 77, at 426).
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encourage the siting of facilities in areas with property values that also attract the
poor and poor minorities. In such a situation, a state desperate to site a facility
may have to try other ways to "coax a community to accept the facility."180
Typically, it is through compensation or incentives that states attempt to locate
unwanted facilities. According to some commentators, however, minority and
poor communities are vulnerable targets to the compensation approach because
they would find the economic inducements especially attractive than would
other more affluent communities. 181
The compensation or incentives approach is problematic for several
reasons. First, this approach is based on the assumption that a community can
be compensated for all costs associated with a facility. Not all costs, however, are
compensable. For instance, communities negotiating compensation do not
always bargain rationally, often neglecting to consider the cost of living in a less
polluted neighborhood. 182 Also, many persons are uncomfortable with placing
a price on health or environmental amenities. 183 Thus, offers for compensation
by developers often are viewed as bribes by individuals who may value
environmental amenities for their own sake. 184 Additionally, while costs may be
compensable at the individual level, the same may not be true at a community
scale. The price for assuming environmental risks may vary across the same
community because persons place different values on environmental
amenities. 185 Moreover, developers may not want to negotiate to determine a
compensation package unless the compensation will check local opposition.
1 8 0Godsil, supra note 77, at 407.
18 1 See, e.g., Bullard in ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS, supra note 13, at 85-86; Godsil, supra
note 77, at 408; COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 56, at 7; Charles Lee, Address at the Boston
Colle e Diversity Month Environmental Racism Speaker Series (Mar. 3, 1992).
1 2 Bacow and Milkey, supra note 88, at 277.
1831d.
184Id.
1851d.
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Even though a community representative may sign a negotiated contract, not all
residents may abide by the agreement.186 For this reason, a developer may not
be willing to negotiate.
Additionally, state siting schemes in general lack mechanisms to promote
the equal distribution of hazardous waste facilities. Most, if not all, state siting
programs were not designed with environmental equity in mind: the legislative
purpose and intent of most, perhaps all, state siting programs do not indicate
environmental equity as a priority. Moreover, where states list important siting
criteria, considerations of race, ethnicity, income, and history and trends of past
siting practices are absent.
Most every state siting statute and program begins with a statement of
legislative intent or purpose, generally indicating concern for the environment,
public health and safety, and reduction of hazardous waste. For example,
Colorado's legislative declaration in the State Hazardous Waste Siting Act
indicates that because
"adverse public health and environmental impacts can result from the
improper land disposal of hazardous waste and that the need for
establishing safe sites with adequate capacity for the disposal of hazardous
waste is a matter of state-wide concern, ... it is the intent of the general
assembly that generators of hazardous waste be encouraged to use on-
site and off-site alternative treatment methods to reduce the amount of
hazardous waste that must be discharged into the environment and the
associated hazards to the health and welfare of the citizens of the state."187
Similarly, the purpose of Indiana's siting program is to "[provide for effective
public participation in the siting process ..., [to] ensure that impacts of hazardous
waste facilities ... on communities are addressed and weighed against the public
186Id. at 277-78.187 1ND. CODE ANN. §13-7-8.6-1(1)-(3) (Burns 1990 & Supp. 1993).
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need for such a facility in the state ..., and [to] encourage ... alternatives to
permanent entombment of hazardous waste [and reduction] of the volume or
degree of hazard of those wastes ...."188 Connecticut's policy is to "assure the
siting of hazardous waste disposal facilities so that the health and safety of
Connecticut's citizens and the environmental and economic interests of the state
are protected. The purpose ... is to establish a process for the siting of hazardous
waste facilities that will protect the health and safety of Connecticut citizens and
assure responsible economic development ...."189 As these examples illustrate,
concerns for environmental equity, at most, may be inferred from general
statements about the importance of health and economic considerations. But
without a direct statement demonstrating a commitment to equity in the
distribution of environmental risks, any progress toward that end would be
coincidental.
In addition to intent and purpose, siting criteria are silent about
environmental equity.189a Most state siting schemes mention risk of accident
during transport of hazardous waste; impact on the community where the
proposed facility is to be located in terms of health, safety, cost, and consistency
with local planning and development; impact on natural environment; and the
impact on the scenic, historical, cultural, and recreational value of the site. 190 The
statutes, however, make no mention of the minority composition of potential
host communities or the historic placement of facilities in these communities. 191
188Id.
1 89 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §22a-114 (West 1985).
189a Although some state statutes may have been enacted before the GAO Report and
Commission Report were published, others were created when information about disparities in
the location of hazardous waste facilities were known. For example, the Mississippi Hazardous
Waste Facility Siting Act of 1990 was ratified after both studies were available. Yet, the Act's
legislative intent and site criteria do not mention race, income, or equal distribution of
hazardous waste facilities. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 17-18-3 and 17-18-15 (Supp. 1993).
19 0 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §299.521a(4) (West 1989 & Supp. 1993).
19 1Some state statutes indicate that no more than one facility may be sited in a county. E.g.,
MINN. STAT. ANN. §115A.21(1) (West 1987 & Supp. 1993).
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Consideration of factors other than those typically listed in state siting schemes
most likely would have to come about through the initiative of public
participants in the siting process. Not listing socio-economic factors, race and
ethnicity, and historic placement of facilities only increases the chance that such
factors will not be part of the siting equation.
Insofar as disproportionate number of hazardous waste facilities are sited
in minority and poor communities, many commentators have made proposals
to advance environmental equity. Section V will discuss some of these.
V. SOLUTIONS PROPOSED BY COMMENTATORS
Proposed solutions fall roughly into one of five categories. The first category is
to challenge siting decisions in federal and state courts based on legal theories
such as common law and equal protection. The next category is to address the
issue legislatively. The third category is to organize at the grass-roots level and
make siting facilities in minority communities politically impossible, or to
encourage local participation to make the siting process fair. Another category is
to resolve the problem in a comprehensive manner using the first three methods
and others simultaneously. The last category is to distribute hazardous waste
facilities equally across geographic areas.
Part V outlines proposals made by various commentators that fall into
each of these categories. It then provides a critique of proposals. The proposals
are reviewed only to show the range of solutions proposed and their
weaknesses and to provide context for a siting model presented in Part VI.
A. Challenging Siting Decisions in the Courts
A community that believes it was targeted to host a hazardous waste
facility because of the minority composition of its residents may have a cause of
action pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 192 Under federal equal protection doctrine, a plaintiff must show
that a state actor behaved with a motivation to discriminate. 193 The burden of
192The Fourteenth Amendment states that "[n]o state shall ... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
1931n the context of the siting of a hazardous waste facility, the standards by which a court
would weigh an equal protection challenge were enunciated by the Supreme Court in
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corporation, 429 U.S. 252 (1977). In Arlington
Heights, the plaintiff sued the town of Arlington Heights for refusing to rezone property from
single family to multifamily use. Id. at 254. A non-profit developer wanted to build low
income housing, which would have attracted underrepresented persons, in a predominantly
White neighborhood. In an opinion written by Justice Powell, the Court held that, although the
ultimate effect of the town's decision not to rezone the property would prove more harmful to
Paee 66
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establishing intent is extremely difficult to do because federal equal protection
jurisprudence requires a degree of proof beyond what is realistically attainable
by most plaintiffs, especially those alleging discrimination in the siting of a
hazardous waste facility. 194 For this reason, Naikang Tsao has argued that state
law is perhaps a more promising avenue.195 Statutory law, common law, and
constitutional law, three possible sources of state judicial relief, are discussed
below.
According to Tsao, the first source of possible state judicial relief is
statutory law. Because state statutes codifying siting procedures contain many
provisions, particular provisions may have been deliberately or accidentally
overlooked by developers attempting to site a facility in a minority
community.196 For example, most siting statutes require that developers apply
for permits from various state regulatory agencies and conduct environmental
impact studies to determine potential environmental, social, and economic effects
of the proposed project. Litigants challenging the siting decision could attempt
minority persons, there was no Fourteenth Amendment violation because the plaintiffs failed to
show discriminatory purpose. Id. at 265; see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244 (1976)
(a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause requires proof of
discriminatory purpose; a showing of disproportionate effect is not enough). Powell outlined
several factors which could show requisite discriminatory purpose. These factors include the
impact of the official action, historical background, sequence of events, departures from normal
decision-making processes, and legislative history. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 267. A
showing of discriminatory effect, according to Powell, was only a starting point. Id. at 266.
1 94 See R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144 (1991), aff'd, No. 91-2144, 1992 U.S. App.
LEXIS 2672 (4th Cir. Oct. 15, 1992) (court held no violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment in the siting of a hazardous waste facility because the plaintiffs failed to
prove discriminatory intent); East-Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon Bibb Planning
and Zoning Comm'n, 896 F.2d 1264 (11th Cir. 1989) (same); Bean v. Southwestern Waste
Management Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673 (1979) (same). See also, e.g., Rodolfo Mata, Inequitable
Siting of Undesirable Facilities and the Myth of Equal Protection, 13 THIRD WORLD L.J. 233, 251
(1993); Godsil, supra note 77, at 416; Regina Austin & Michael Schill, Black, Brown, Poor &
Poisoned: Minority Grassroots Environmentalism and the Quest for Eco-Justice, 1 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POLY 69, 73 (1991).
19 5 Tsao, supra note 6, at 379-405. Tsao was a law student at New York University at the
time the article was written.
196See id. at 380.
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to show that the statutory language was disregarded, 197 or that there were flaws
in the review of the potential impacts of the project.198 If successful, the state
judiciary may block or delay the siting of the facility.
The second possible source of state judicial relief is state common law.
Common law is the body of principles and rules of action deriving authority
solely from custom and usage across time, or from the decisions and opinions of
the courts "recognizing, affirming and enforcing such usages and customs."199 In
particular, siting practices may be challenged under two common law
theories.2 00
The first theory is anticipatory nuisance. In general, a "[n]uisance
comprehends interference with an owner's reasonable use and enjoyment of his
property by means of smoke, odors, noise, or vibration, ...."201 A nuisance claim
may be brought against a developer even if the project conforms with zoning
laws or has a permit to operate.202 In one example, a group of residents
attempted to enjoin the siting of a proposed hazardous waste facility on the
defendant's property.203 The plaintiffs provided expert testimony about the
19 7To show that a state agency disregarded statutory language in granting a developer a
permit to build a facility, a plaintiff could argue that the community is already overly burdened
with such facilities. Id. at 381. By showing statistically the disproportionate number of facilities
in the community, the commentator argues that it may be possible for the litigants to prove that
an increase in such facilities would constitute a nuisance. In some states, statutes do not allow
the siting of a facility if it would constitute a nuisance. Id.at 382. Thus, this commentator
argues, a failure to follow statutory law in this respect could stop the proposed project.
19 8 1d. at 381. If a litigant were successful in showing that the environmental impact study
was inadequate, a developer would be forced to redo the study.
199BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 250-51 (5th ed. 1979).
200Tsao, supra note 6, at 383.
201BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 199, at 961. Nuisances fall into one of three
categories. A public nuisance affects an indefinite number of persons within a particular
locality, even though the annoyance may affect individuals unequally. A private nuisance is
"an invasion of a person's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land by any type of
liability forming conduct." Id. A mixed nuisance may at the same time be both a private and
public nuisance. Id.
2 0 2Tsao, supra note 6, at 385 (citing Ronald J. Rychlak, Common-Law Remedies for
Environmental Wrongs: The Role of Private Nuisance, 59 MISS. L.J. 657, 662 (1989)).20 31d. at 387 (discussing Salter v. B.W.S. Corp., 290 So. 2d 821 (La. 1974)).
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possibility that buried chemicals could contaminate drinking wells in the area.
The defendant's expert witnesses countered that the site could be managed
safely. Although the court indicated that an injunction is proper only when "the
proposed operations will occasion irreparable injury" the court issued a qualified
injunction because "the consequences of failure to exercise great care to prevent
the escape of poisonous materials are so serious...."204 Tsao concludes that
"anticipatory nuisance is a promising approach because the legal theory on which
it rests evolved to address resident's health and safety concerns, and to protect
property from devaluation and irreparable harm."205
The second common law theory is the duty to serve doctrine. The duty to
serve doctrine posits that where "a state's decision to allow a monopoly (the
right to operate a ferry, bakery or grain mill, for example) was a privilege
bestowed upon the private party receiving monopoly rights," the party is
required by the courts "to provide 'full use (access for all)' and an 'absence of
abuse (rendition of a service of reasonable quality and price)' to the
community."206 Various state courts have extended this doctrine to include
private utilities serving the public. 207 Tsao, however, indicates that the duty to
serve doctrine, at best, "has strong implications for a party seeking to challenge
the siting of a hazardous waste facility."208 The concept., the commentator
argues, perhaps could apply to the distribution of risks, as in the siting of
hazardous waste facilities. Under this theory, a plaintiff would argue that their
community was not afforded equal treatment as that of other more affluent or
20 41d. (citing 290 So. 2d 824-325).
2 0 51d.
2 06 Id. at 388 (quoting CHARLES M. HAAR & DANIEL W. FESSLER, THE WRONG SIDE OF
THE TRACKS: A REVOLUTIONARY REDISCOVERY OF THE COMMON LAW TRADITION OF
FAIRNESS IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST INEQUALITY 74-75 (1986)).
20 71d. at 389.
20 8 1d. at 390 (emphasis added).
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White communities in the distribution of public burdens, such as hazardous
waste facilities. The appeal of this common law theory is that it avoids the use of
federal constitutional law and, therefore, does not required proof of
discriminatory intent.
State constitutions may provide another source of judicial relief. In
general, there are two state constitutional law theories. The first is a claim based
on a state's constitutional equality clause, if it exists, that has been interpreted
more broadly than the federal equal protection doctrine.209 Although most state
constitutions do not contain an equal protection clause like that of the U.S.
Constitution, many do have language that calls for equality of treatment.210
Because judges in some states are elected, they may be highly susceptible to the
will of voters and other elected officials.211 As such, Tsao argues that some state
court systems have been more flexible in expanding the boundaries of equal
protection jurisprudence than the federal court system. In short, where a litigant
may be unsuccessful with a claim premised on the Fourteenth Amendment, the
same claim may win in a state court on a theory based on state equal protection.
The second state constitutional law theory is a cause of action based on a
particular provision of a state constitution, which address environmental
protection, exclusionary zoning, health, poverty or any other germane
category. 212 For example, plaintiffs could argue that a siting proposal is
inconsistent with a state's constitutional proviso providing for environmental
protection. Similar arguments could be made based on other constitutional
provisions. 213
2091d. at 398.
2101d. at 396.2 11See id. at 395-96.
2 121d. at 398.
213For a full discussion of this theory see id. at 399-401.
B. Legislative Approaches
Legislation addressing the distribution of environmental risks is currently
under consideration in both the United States Senate and House of
Representatives. The bill, introduced to the Senate by Democratic Senator Max
Bakus of Montana and known as the Environmental Justice Act of 1993 (Bill), is
intended to create and maintain information "which provides an objective basis
for assessment of health effects by income and race"; to identify areas of the
country with the largest releases of toxic chemicals into the environment; to
determine the effects possibly caused by emissions in areas of highest
environmental impact; to make certain that groups or persons living in
"Environmental High Impact Areas" (EHIA) have both the opportunity and
resources to partake in the procedures "which will determine the possible
existence of adverse health impacts"; to "identify those activities in [EHIAs] found
to have significant adverse impacts on human health"; and " to incorporate
environmental equity considerations into planning and implementation of all
Federal environmental programs and statutes."214
The Bill uses the terms "toxic chemicals" and "toxic chemical facility" in a
broad manner, encompassing the definitions of all major federal environmental
laws.215 Limited to federal facilities, 216 the Bill outlines in broad strokes a
214S. 1161, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1)-(6) (1993). A comparison with the House version,
H.R. 2105 § 3 (6), which states that a purpose of the Bill is "to ensure that significant adverse
health impacts that may be associated with environmental pollution in the United States are not
distributed inequitably." (emphasis added) shows that the House version offers a more direct call
for equal distribution of environmental risks.
According to Paul Mohai, Associate Professor at the School of Natural Resources and
Environment at the University of Michigan, there are about six bills in Congress advancing
"environmental justice" or containing an environmental component. Moreover, several state
legislatures also are proposing environmental justice bills. Paul Mohai, Overview:
Environmental Equity 35 ENVIRONMENT 2, 2 (Sept. 1993).
215See S. 1161 § 4(3)(A)-(F) and (5)(A)-(F). These laws include the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 et seq.
(1988); the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136 et. seq. (1988);
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001 et seq.
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program designed "to ensure nondiscriminatory compliance with
environmental, health, and safety laws and to ensure equal protection of the
public health."217
Section five of the Bill deals with the identification of environmental high
impact areas and remedial and preventative measures. This section defines
EHIAs as the top 100 counties ("or other appropriate geographic unit") with the
highest toxic chemical releases (during the most recent five-year period).218 The
list would be compiled by the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency (Administrator), with help from the Agency for Toxic Substances and
Disease Registry, the National Institute for Environmental Health Sciences, the
National Center for Health Statistics, and the Bureau of the Census.219
Moreover, the Bill calls for the Administrator to calculate and create a data base
with information for each county or geographic unit, about categories such as
the total weight of toxic chemicals released into the environment, the total
weight of toxic materials released into the "air, water, land and workplace," and
the total weight of each toxic chemical "released into the ambient environment
and into each environmental media."220 The Administrator also would be
required to "review the methodology used to compile and summarize
information collected under ... the Emergency Planning and Community Right-
(1988); the Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3300f et. seq. (1988); the Occupational and
Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. 615 et .seq. (1988); and the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et. seq. (1988).
216S. 1161 § 4(5)(F) ("the term 'toxic chemical facility' shall include any Federal facility that
releases a toxic chemical").
217S. 1161. The bill was introduced to the Senate on June 24, 1993, and to the House on
May 12, 1993. The Senate version of the Bill is discussed, with reference to the House version
where the bills differ, because the Senate version represents a later draft.
218S. 1161 § 5(d)(1). A release is defined as any "spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring,
emitting, emptying, discharging, ejecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the
environment...." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (1988).2 1 9 S. 1161 § 5(c)(1).
220S. 1161 § 5(b) and (c)(2)(A)-(C). Environmental media are identified as air, water, land
and workplace.
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to-Know Act", and to put any proposed changes in methodology before the
public for comment.221 Once ElHA are determined, the Administrator and the
Secretary of Labor could inspect hazardous waste facilities in these areas to
ensure they are operating in compliance with all applicable environmental health
and safety standards. 222
Additionally, the Secretary of Health and Human Services would issue a
report identifying the nature and degree of "acute and chronic" effects on human
health in EHIAs from exposure to toxic chemicals. The effects to which this
provision refers include incidence of cancer, birth defects, infant mortality rates,
and respiratory diseases. The report would contain comparisons of health
impacts in EHIAs with other counties in the United States, and would be used to
isolate the impacts of environmental pollution; to separate the effects of other
factors such as health care availability or substance abuse; to rank the relative
risks caused by the different sources of toxic chemicals "both individually and
cumulatively"; to "take into account the need to remedy the impacts of such toxic
chemicals in high population density areas"; to determine the level below which
releases of toxic chemicals must be reduced to avoid detrimental impacts on
human health; and to evaluate the impacts of keeping toxic chemical release at
present levels.223
The Bill establishes that, if the report determines there are "significant
adverse impacts" from exposure to toxic chemicals on human health in EHIAs,
the President of the United States would make proposals to Congress for
administrative and legislative changes to rectify and prevent the adverse
impacts. The recommendations may include adding facilities or chemicals to the
2 2 1S. 1161 § 5(C)(3).2 22 S. 1161 § 5(d)(2)(A).
223S. 1161 § 5(d)(3)(A)-(F).
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reporting requirements of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-
Know Act of 1986, or reducing threshold quantities of chemicals that precipitates
reporting requirements under the Right-to-Know Act; regulating toxic chemicals
not subject to federal law because of statutory or administrative exemption; and
imposing more regulatory standards for hazardous waste facilities in an EHIA,
such as emissions fees, source reduction requirements, or restrictions on toxic
chemical releases.224
Section six of the Bill serves as an enforcement mechanism. If the report,
issued by the Secretary of Health and Human Services identifies significant
adverse impacts on human health from exposure to toxic chemicals in EHIAs,
"the Administrator [of the EPA] shall promulgate regulations applicable to any
Federal permit" for the building or modifying of facilities in that area. These
regulations are to call for a net reduction in the release of any toxic chemicals
responsible for the "significant adverse impacts on human health in that area."225
The House version of the Bill contains more direct measures to rectify
negative health impacts in EHIAs than the Senate draft. The House bill indicates
that if there is a finding of "significant adverse impacts of environmental
pollution on human health in EHIAs, there shall be a moratorium on the siting or
permitting of any new toxic chemical facility in any EHIA."226 Only those
proposed facilities shown to release toxic chemicals in amounts found to cause
significant adverse impacts on human health are subject to the moratorium.
There are, however, provisions providing for exceptions to the
moratorium. A new toxic chemical facility may be sited if "the need for the
activity is shown to the Secretary [of the United States Department of Health and
224S. 1161 § 5(d)(4)(A)-(C).
225S. 1161 § 6.226H.R. 2105, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. tit. IV § 403 (1993) (emphasis added). The Senate
version makes no mention of a moratorium.
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Human Services]. "227 The owner or operator of the facility, however, must
demonstrate that the proposed facility would operate in accordance with a "plan"
and "will maintain a comprehensive pollution prevention program."
Additionally, the facility must establish "that it will minimize uncontrolled
releases into the environment." Only if these three conditions are met will an
exception to the moratorium be made. In any event, the moratorium would
remain effective in the given EHIA "until the Administrator determines, upon
petition of any interested party, that the health-based levels [of toxic chemicals
are attained]."228
Finally, both the Senate and the House versions of the proposed Bill
provide for technical assistance grants. Generally, the Secretary of Health and
Human Services may award a grant to any person or group possibly affected by
a release or threatened release of a toxic chemical from any toxic chemical facility
in an EHIA. The grants are intended to assist representatives of EHIAs in
becoming active public participants under the Bill and "other related laws." The
grant also may be used to get technical assistance "relating to the inspection and
review authorities ... and the study described [earlier in the Act]."229
In summary, the proposed Bill affects facility siting tangentially. To the
extent that regulations reduce net releases of toxic chemicals by influencing siting
decisions, the Senate version probably would not have a direct effect. Although
the House draft provides for a moratorium, the ban is subject to an exception.
The proposed Bill has the greatest potential to effect environmental equity by
observing, categorizing, and rectifying inequitable risk burdens in general.
22 7 H.R. 2105 tit. IV § 403(1).
22 8 H.R. 2105 tit. IV § 403(2), (3).
2 29 S. 1161 § 7(a) through (b)(1)(A) and (B). Grants are subject to appropriations and limited
to $50,000. Id. § 7(b)(1)(C).
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Another piece of federal legislation also has been proposed to address
environmental inequities; it seeks to overcome the nearly impossible task of
proving a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Rachel Godsil proposes a "federal equity mandate," modeled on
Title VII.230 Essentially, the mandate would remove the burden of proving
discriminatory purpose by establishing that a showing of disparate impact would
be sufficient to prove a violation. Under disparate impact theory, the law would
address the "consequences of site selection rather than the motivations."231
Under the proposed federal equity mandate, two elements would
constitute a cause of action: disparate impact and "environmental necessity."
Under this model, plaintiffs would bear the initial burden of showing that the
siting decision would impose a disparate burden on a minority community
relative to white communities. Communities affected financially or physically by
the sites would be considered the "relevant population affected." The object of
the proposed legislation is to give minority communities a tool to keep their
communities "from being overburdened by environmental hazards." Thus,
showing disparate impact would require demonstrating the greater burden
imposed by the facility on the minority community than on a white community
because of the presence of other pollutants. Once impact is established, the
defendant-state agency would have to show that the decision was an
"environmental necessity." A showing that the site was environmentally suitable
meets this burden. The plaintiff then would have to provide evidence revealing
the availability of alternative sites. If the plaintiff demonstrates that alternative
23042 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 to 2000e-17 (1988). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
@@ 2000(e) et seq. (1988), prohibits discrimination because of race, color, religion, sex, and
national origin in the workplace. See, supra, notes 45-47 and accompanying text.231Godsil, supra note 77, at 421-27. At the time this article was written, Godsil was a law
student at University of Michigan Law School.
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sites exist, the defendant would have to prove that the site chosen was necessary
to dispose of toxic chemical waste in a safe manner. If the defendant is able to
show environmental necessity, the facility would be sited in spite of the disparate
impact.232
Another proposal by Godsil addresses the rationale behind the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act. The proposal calls for Congress to amend its
national policy declared in RCRA from reducing the generation of toxic chemical
wastes to "the amelioration of the disparate burden of toxic chemical waste
facilities on minority communities." Presently, the EPA approves only state
programs created to protect health and the environment.233 The proposal,
therefore, adds the further requirement that state programs be "designed to
resolve the disproportionate effects of toxic chemical waste on minority
communities."234
Other recommendations by Godsil are directed toward state governments
and state siting mechanisms. States are urged to "declare as an objective the
eradication of race-based inequalities" in the distribution of the negative burdens
of hazardous waste facilities. Toward this end, the site designation approach,
coupled with the super review approach, 235 the author argues, offers the best
method to site facilities. Godsil explains that the site designation and super
review approach would allow the relevant state agency (and not the developer)
to appraise the existing distribution of hazardous waste facilities and ascertain
whether minority communities are overly impacted. If minority communities
2 3 2 Godsil, supra note 77, at 422-23.2331d. at 424 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6902 (b) (1988) (authorizing state programs)).
2 34Id.
235See, supra, Part IV.B.1 and 2 for a discussion of these approaches.
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are particularly affected, race and socio-economics could be used as a criterion
when generating a list of potential sites.236
Under Godsil's recommendation, the task for drawing a list of potential
sites is relegated to a state agency pursuant to the super review approach,
instead of allowing a developer to designate sites. In this manner, the proposal
eliminates a frequent criticism that developers select sites on cost considerations.
To further legitimate the proposed hybrid siting process, the author
recommends the creation of a siting board responsible for facilitating
communication and information between the state and potential host sites. The
purpose of the board would be to minimize local opposition.
The state agency responsible for compiling a list of potential sites would
take into consideration the site's "environmental suitability, economic feasibility,
impacts on local residents (including risks), detrimental effects on agriculture and
natural resources, and whether the community is already host to noxious
facilities or exposed to environmental hazards."237 If several sites meet the
criteria, the board would scrutinize the racial and socio-economic characteristics
of the potential sites. If minority communities contain a disproportionate
number of facilities, the board would remove from the list of potential sites areas
containing a majority minority population.238 Thus, the proposed process would
address the issue of disproportionate placement of facilities in minority
communities and environmental factors as well.
Whereas legal and legislative channels to environmental equity rely on
the actions and initiative of professionals and politicians, grass-roots activism can
instigate court action, lead to changes in the law, and produce fairer siting
2 36 Godsil, supra note 77, at 425.
237I. at 426.
238Md.
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decisions. For this reason, several commentators believe that grass-root activism
and local participation in siting processes is an effective measure against unfair
distribution of hazardous waste facilities.
C. Grass-Roots Activism and Local Participation
The relatively high incidence of toxic facilities in minority communities, as
documented by the Commission and the GAO Reports, does not violate
applicable environmental laws. This contributes to concerns over environmental
equity. Luke W. Cole, staff attorney for the California Rural Legal Assistance
Foundation, argues that because the siting of such facilities is a "political process
from which people of color have been historically excluded and in which people
of color are grossly underrepresented today ... the outcome -- more facilities in
people of color's communities -- is neither surprising nor unpredictable." As
such, any reliance on the law to effect changes in the way hazardous waste
facilities are distributed is bound to fail. Instead, "the real answer to
environmental racism ... [is] grass-roots activism."239
Cole argues that, for four reasons, the only way to achieve more
equitable distribution of environmental risks is through political activism at the
grass-roots level. First, Cole asserts, by challenging siting decisions perceived as
discriminatory, grass-roots activists have compelled industries to change their
approach to waste disposal, from controlling pollution to preventing pollution.
Cole argues that with fewer waste disposal sites, the cost of disposal has risen to
such an extent that manufacturing processes are changing to eliminate toxic
waste products. "By forcing a permanent solution to toxic waste disposal
239Cole, supra note 13, at 1995-%. Another commentator maintains that, along with
legislative acting, grass-roots involvement is necessary to "raise the political capital of
minorities." Godsil, supra note 77, at 426. Although legislation potentially may proscribe
environmental inequity, politicians may not subscribe to siting policies unpopular with
influential constituents.
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problems, grass roots activists have done what hundred of federal laws and
regulations on pollution control have failed to do: they have reduced toxic
waste."240 A reduction in waste corresponds to a reduction in the need to site
new facilities.
Second, Cole argues that because the decision to site a facility is a "political
and economic" one, a political mechanism is what is needed to change the
decision, not a legal one. As Cole states, "legal tools are blunt and slow." 241
Third, Cole posits that challenging siting decisions in the courts "plays
right into the polluter's hands." Polluters generally can afford to hire lawyers,
scientists, and other professionals necessary to wage a formidable legal battle.
Activists, on the other hand, most often do not have the necessary financial
resources. Activists, however, do have "the power of people" in their favor. In
effect, taking the dispute out of court and "into the streets" is a tactical advantage
for grass-roots activists.242
Finally, Cole argues that the failure of civil rights laws to fight racism is
testimony to the inadequacy of these laws to address "environmental racism."243
Cole asserts that the change brought by the civil rights movement of the 1950s
and 1960s through the "hundreds of thousands of activists taking to the streets
across the country -- has been sapped away by increasingly conservative courts."
Rather than trying to expand civil rights theories in unsympathetic courts, Cole
insists that "[1]ike the civil rights activists of yesterday, we must return to the
streets with our demands."244
2 4 0Cole, supra note 13, at 1996 (citing Calif. Dept. of Health Services, State and Industy Join
Together to Reduce Hazardous Waste (press release, Sept. 7, 1990) and BARRY COMMONER,
MAKING PEACE WITH THE PLANET 130-40, 178-90 (1991)).
241Id.
242Id.
2 4 31d. 1996-97.
2 4 41d. 1997.
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Whereas Cole sees grass-roots activism as a way to effect environmental
equity by defeating siting proposals and encouraging industry to generate less
waste, Lawrence S. Bacow, Professor of Law and Environmental Policy at the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Department of Urban Studies and
Planning, sees local participation as an important part of a fair siting process, not
necessarily as a means to defeat siting proposals.
Professor Bacow implicates economic considerations for the selection of
hazardous waste sites by facility developers.245 Because land and labor costs are
most frequently lower in poor communities, both construction and operating
expenses will probably be less in these areas as well. Moreover, "social costs",
such as potential air and water contamination, possible risks to human health
from exposure to dangerous chemicals or industrial accidents, noise and
congestion resulting from increased traffic, and the "stigma" of living near an
undesirable facility, are also probably less in poorer communities. Thus,
Professor Bacow argues that efficiency in social and economic costs "will almost
always favor locations in poor, disadvantaged neighborhoods."246
Bacow explains that health and amenity are "normal goods" in that
persons are likely to spend more to maintain their health and amenities as
income and wealth increase.2 47 As such, the wealthy will spend more than the
poor to preserve these normal goods. Bacow concludes that "[als long as the
poor are driven by economic circumstances to accept less than the rich for
compensation for a lost amenity and exposure to health risk, it will always be
245Lawrence S. Bacow, Waste and Fairness: No Easy Answers, FORUM FOR APPLIED RES. &
PUB. POL'Y 43, 43 (Spring 1993). See also PLATER, supra note 99, at 41: "Corporations ... are
resolutely driven by self-interest, responding to the equations of profit maximization with,
understandably, no inherent charitable impulse to take on costs when not required to do so."
246Bacow, supra note 245, at 43-44.2471d. at 44.
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less expensive for developers and more efficient for society ... to site waste
facilities in poor areas."248
As to considerations of fairness, however, Professor Bacow readily
acknowledges the difficulties posed by the moral question of whether health or
environmental amenities should be "rationed" by price. Similarly, Bacow
recognizes an alternative explanation for the location of facilities: the "lack [of]
legal means and political power to thwart construction" of these facilities in poor
neighborhoods. Nevertheless, Professor Bacow argues that as long as the poor
value social costs less than the rich, these facilities "will be drawn to poor
areas."249
As an example, Bacow posed a hypothetical bid for a facility. Two
communities -- one rich and the other poor -- bid for a proposed facility. A bid
would represent the amount of compensation required in order for the
community to accept the facility. The lower bidding community would retain
the facility. In this scenario, the poor community would enter the lower bid
because the wealthy community would not be as willing to exchange the loss of
amenities and possible environmental dangers for economic compensation.250
As Bacow points out, however, in reality a pure auction with fully informed
participants does not exist. Instead, access to political power and legal resources
are used as proxies for bids. Because poor communities lack the resources to
garner political clout and legal assistance, they host the facility and are under-
compensated as well.251
Bacow posits that the most unfair aspect of the waste facility siting process
"is that the poor have no choices, informed or otherwise." Without legal or
2 4 8Id. at 45.
249Md.
2 5 0 d. at 46.
2 51See id.
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political resources, the poor cannot challenge a proposed facility; nor can they
accurately determine the environmental risks because they do not have the
technical sophistication. Moreover, Bacow states, even if they understand the
risks, they would tend to accept any economic benefits accompanying the
facility. Finally, the poor, unlike the rich, do not have the resources to move if
the unwanted facility is ultimately sited in their community. Given that there will
always be poor people, Bacow poses the issue as one of reforming the siting
process so that the risks associated with facilities do not have a disproportionate
impact on the poor.252 He then critiques several possible reforms.
The first reform Professor Bacow discusses and criticizes is the de-
emphasizing of economic considerations in selecting sites. This would address
the problem of minimizing the social and economic costs imposed on the poor.
Bacow finds this reform problematic, however. He argues that in de-
emphasizing economic costs, facilities would be sited in higher social-cost
locations.253 Moreover, Professor Bacow argues that if economic considerations
are minimized, it is unclear what criteria would be used instead. Basing siting
criteria only on environmental concerns ignores the political influences inherent
in siting regulations. The only way pure environmental criteria would work is if
the entire siting process were removed from public scrutiny and judicial
review.2m This is highly unlikely.
Another possible reform is requiring each community to dispose of its
own waste within its jurisdiction. From the perspective of economics and the
environment, however, this reform is impractical. It is impractical because
economies of scale exist in the waste disposal industry. That is, if every
252Id.
2531d. at 47.254Id.
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community were required to dispose of its own hazardous waste, disposal costs
would increase to prohibitive levels. 255 Moreover, not every community would
have locations physically suitable to serve safely as a disposal site. Bacow also
argues that this reform would produce the same environmental equity issues it
was supposed to amend: the facilities would gravitate to poorer areas of a
community.256
In spite of his critical review of possible reforms, Professor Bacow
concludes with some recommendations for improvement in siting processes.
Bacow calls on "government" to make certain that poor communities are
represented in the siting process. Specifically, poor communities should have
access to technical and legal assistance. Where potential host communities lack
these resources, " the siting process should provide them." Finally, Professor
Bacow calls on government to try to ensure that all communities make
"informed judgment[s] about potential waste-management facilit[ies]." 257 If a
community is willing to assume the risks associated with a facility, in exchange
for compensation, then it should be entitled to host a facility.
Briefly, Professor Bacow's recommendations suggest that local
participation is imperative to informed decision-making by communities. Only
when a community is fully aware of its options can it commit itself to hosting a
facility for compensation. The role of government is to insure that the process is
conducive to informed local participation.
Like Professor Bacow, Kelly Michele Colquette and Elizabeth A. Henry
Robertson, attorneys in Texas, argue that public participation is the key to fair
siting of hazardous waste facilities. After presenting evidence showing what the
2 5 5 See id.
256 Id.
2571d. at 48.
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authors call "environmental racism",258 the commentators discuss several
approaches to combating such inequity in the courts. Ultimately, however, the
authors concluded that the only solution is reforming the siting process itself.
They find especially problematic the lack of notification of local residents by
developers proposing to construct a facility.
The authors argue that the siting process "does not lend itself to agency
flexibility once the application [for a new facility] reaches the public comment
stage."259 The authors indicate that, in most states, local residents remain
unaware of a developer's permit application until a draft permit is prepared for
public comment. As the authors note, by the time the permit is open to public
comment, the developer already has submitted a permit application and the
agency already has prepared an initial draft permit, a fact sheet outlining the
reasons for the draft permit, and an administrative record.260 The authors argue
that, because of the long period of time between the initial application and public
notice, developers have had a chance to promote their project. Hence, when the
public finally is included in the dialogue, administrative decisions already have
been made in favor of siting the facility at the location in question.
Arguing that public participation is essential from the initial stages of the
siting process, the authors conclude that states should require public notice when
developers present applications for a permit. The commentators note that:
[bly allowing the residents to voice their concerns early in the process,
residents will retain a sense of control over their future well-being. The
residents no longer have to rely on a political process that involves the
2 5 8Kelly Michele Colquette & Elizabeth A. Henry Robertson, Environmental Racism: The
Causes, Consequences and Commendations, 5 TULANE ENVTL L.J. 153, 158-62 (1991). The
commentators used the findings of the GAO Report and the Commission Report, discussed
supra, to support their claim of "environmental racism."2 591d. at 206.
26 0 1d. at 205 (citing to National Primacy Drinking Water Regulations Implementation, 40
C.F.R. § 124.6-.9 (1989)).
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bargaining of votes or an agency process that has little political
accountability. Rather, the residents can advance their concerns and needs
in a forum that is more likely to lead to change.261
In short, when residents are given the opportunity to participate meaningfully in
the siting process, fair siting decisions allegedly result.
Lawrence Susskind, Professor Urban Studies and Environmental Planning
at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), and David Laws, a doctoral
candidate in the Department of Urban Studies and Planning (at MIT as well), also
emphasize the over-all importance of public participation in siting processes.
They describe a number of guidelines, together known as the "Facility Siting
Credo", for siting facilities. Most of the guidelines pertain to public participation,
trust, and consensus building.262 Although the Credo was not created entirely
out of concern for environmental equity, it does promote public participation
which some commentators believe is essential for environmental equity.
Noting that public opposition to "regionally necessary but locally noxious
facilities" has made siting them difficult, Laws and Susskind argue that "unless
residents in potential 'host' communities are treated as knowledgeable
individuals who can make an important contribution, and unless their concerns
are treated as legitimate, most siting processes will fail."263 Accordingly, the
guidelines center around improving public participation and enhancing the
legitimacy of siting processes.
26 11d. at 206.
262 See Laws & Susskind, supra note 75, at 29. The following are the elements of the
"Facility Siting Credo": 1) seek consensus; 2) work to develop trust; 3) set realistic timetables; 4)
get agreement that the status quo is unacceptable; 5) choose the design that best addresses the
problem; 6) guarantee that stringent safety standards will be met; 7) fully compensate all
negative impacts of a facility; 8) use contingent agreements; 9) keep multiple options on the
table at all times; 10) make the host community better off; 11) seek acceptable sites through a
volunteer process; 12) consider a competitive siting process; 13) work for geographic fairness.
2631d. at 29.
Part V: Proposed Solutions Page 87
One guideline is that siting processes should seek consensus by involving
all groups who may be affected by a siting decision. By so doing, they argue,
there would be fewer accusations of unfairness. They also indicate that siting
procedures would work to develop trust. Specifically, they claim that any failure
on the state's part (or on part of the government entity or developer) to
acknowledge uncertainty about benefits and risks associated with a proposed
facility would lead to distrust, and possibly impede siting progress. 263a Laws and
Susskind also call for "geographic fairness", as discussed below.
D. Geographic Fairness
Another possible remedy to unequal distribution of hazardous waste
facilities is "geographic fairness." The concept of geographic fairness holds that
"[n]o single community or neighborhood should be the site for many noxious
facilities."264
New York City recently adopted a set of criteria for geographic fairness,
with the purpose of "furthering the fair distribution among communities of city
facilities."265 The criteria, applicable to siting or expanding regional or city-wide
facilities, include considering the distribution of similar facilities across the city.
Similarly, criteria for transportation and waste management facilities call for
considering "the number and proximity" of facilities so as to "avoid aggregate
noise, odor, or air quality impacts on adjacent residential areas."266 These
considerations would prevent the siting of many facilities in a given poor or
minority community.
263a Id. at 36-37.
26 41d. at 39; see NEW YORK PLANNING COMMISSION, CRITERIA FOR THE LOCATION OF
CITY FACILITIES art. 2(f) (purpose and goals) ("Lessen disparities among communities in the
level of responsibility each bears for facilities serving city-wide or regional needs") [hereinafter
NYC Criteria].2 6 5NYC Criteria art. 2.
2661d. art. 6.42.
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Although the proposals previously discussed fall into different categories,
most of the commentators indicate that a multifaceted approach to address
environmental inequities is necessary. Examples of a comprehensive approach
include the recommendations provided by the Commission Report and EPA
Equity Report.
E. Comprehensive Approach
After the Commission Report reaches its conclusions regarding race,
income, and hazardous waste facilities, it provides a wide range of
recommendations. The Commission Report directs these to federal, state, and
municipal governments, churches, community organizations, and other public
and private institutions. 267
The Commission Report specifically calls upon the President of the United
States to issue an executive order instructing all executive branch agencies
dealing with hazardous wastes to review the affects their policies and regulations
have on minority communities, and to take these into account when creating
new policies and promulgating new regulations. The Commission Report also
recommends that the EPA promptly create an Office of Hazardous Wastes and
Racial and Ethnic Affairs to address issues surrounding the high number of
hazardous waste facilities found in minority communities. The recommendation
further calls for the office to oversee the siting of new hazardous waste facilities
to make certain that racial and socio-economic factors of possible host
communities are considered. Finally, the Commission Report recommends that
the United States Congress hold hearings to determine whether minority
2 67 Because the Commission Report included in these recommendations measures only
tangentially related to the siting of commercial hazardous waste facilities, only those suggestions
pertaining to the siting of such facilities will be discussed. Other recommendations will be
mentioned in footnotes.
Pane 89
communities are more vulnerable as potential hosts of hazardous waste facilities
under existing environmental policies than their white counterparts.268
The Commission Report also provides recommendations for state
governments. The report calls on state governments to examine their siting
criteria to determine whether they play a role in making minority communities
more vulnerable to hosting hazardous waste facilities. The report indicates that
states should take into account the racial and socio-economic characteristics of
potential host communities when siting facilities.269
The Commission Report makes several recommendations for municipal
governments as well. The report calls for municipal governments to enact
legislation protecting densely populated and other "high risk" residential areas
from the siting of hazardous waste facilities. 270
26 8COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 56, at 24-25. The Commission Report also suggests
that Congress hold hearings to ascertain the impact of hazardous wastes on the "health and well-
being" of racial and ethnic communities. Id. at 25.
The Commission Report makes other recommendations for the federal government.
The report calls for the establishment of a National Advisory council on Racial and Ethnic
Concerns, comprised of representatives from Black American, Hispanic American, Asian
American, Pacific Islander and American Indian communities. The council would provide the
EPA with advice on environmental issues and assist in disseminating information to racial and
ethnic communities across the United States. The report suggests that the Administrator of the
Agency for Toxic Substance and Disease Registry conduct health assessments of Superfund sites,
regardless of whether they are on the National Priorities List. The Commission Report calls
upon the EPA to sponsor a national conference to inform racial and ethnic groups of its activities
to protect communities from hazardous wastes exposure. The Report suggests that the
Department of Health and Human Services conduct epidemiological studies to see if hazardous
wastes are contributing to health problems in racial and ethnic communities. The report
recommends that the U.S. Congress enact legislation mandating a report from the Departments
of health and Human Services, Department of Transportation, the Agency for Toxic Substances
and Disease Registry, and the EPA outlining their activities to protect communities from the
effects of hazardous wastes. Id. at 24-25.
269Id. at 25. There are other recommendations for state governments. The Commission
Report suggests that states review their environmental policies to determine if racial and ethnic
communities are being protected from hazardous wastes. The report also recommends that state
governments determine the negative impact hazardous waste facilities had on the economic
development of racial and ethnic communities. Finally, the report suggests that state health
agencies instigate epidemiological studies of racial and ethnic communities with many active
hazardous waste facilities and uncontrolled sites. Id. at 25.2701d. at 26. The report provides other recommendations for municipal governments. For
example, the Commission Report calls on municipal governments to create and finance task
forces comprised of representatives of racial and ethnic communities to address issues arising
from hazardous waste sites in their communities. The report recommends that municipal
1D- f 11 Pirr% ncarl Vn11kjtfinnQa a V -
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Finally, the Commission Report provides recommendations for churches
and community organizations and other institutions and corporations. The
report urges local congregations, community organizations, and residents to
"thoroughly investigate existing toxic chemical waste sites in their communities"
and to seek advice on possible problems created by hazardous wastes from
environmental agencies, organizations and experts. The report calls on
corporations that may operate off-site hazardous waste treatment, storage, and
disposal facilities to review and amend siting policies to ensure that they do not
"reflect a bias" for siting facilities in minority communities. 271
Like the Commission Report, the EPA Equity Report provides several
recommendations to promote environmental equity. The Equity Report also
indicates that both public and private groups and institutions should share the
governments urge the EPA to amend criteria used to designate hazardous waste sites on the
National Priorities List to make certain that sites in racial and ethnic communities are sufficiently
included for priority cleanup. Finally, the report recommends that the U.S. Conference of
Mayors, the National Conference of Black Mayors, and the National League of Cities hold a
national conference to address the high incidence of hazardous waste sites in racial and ethnic
communities. COMMISSION REPORT at 26.
2 7 1 d. at 26-27. The Commission Report has several other recommendations for community
groups and academic institutions. The report calls on churches to sponsor "teach-ins" in racial
and ethnic communities with the purpose of educating citizens on how to organize and confront
hazardous wastes issues. The report suggests that civil rights and political organizations should
conduct voter registration drives to "empower" racial and ethnic communities to address
hazardous waste and environmental issues and to place these concerns high on state and
national legislative agendas. The report also recommends that racial and ethnic residents and
organizations instigate legal actions to bring the issues surrounding hazardous wastes in their
communities before the courts and federal and state agencies. Similarly, the report recommends
that community organizations establish legal assistance programs to assist racial and ethnic
communities and individuals seek compensation for injuries believed to be caused by exposure
to hazardous wastes and environmental pollutants. Id. at 26-27.
Moreover, the Commission Report makes several notable recommendations for research
institutions and universities. The report calls on researchers to initiate the gathering of data and
demographic research to determine whether the Commission Report findings were consistent
with other environmental pollutants in racial and ethnic communities. The report calls on
universities to assist racial and ethnic students look for training in fields related to
environmental protection, including the establishment of a scholarship program to assist in the
process. Finally, the report calls on universities to develop an "environmental sociology"
curricula for the study of racial and socio-economic patters related to environmental pollution.
Id. at 27.
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responsibility of distributing environmental risks in a more equitable manner.
The Report provides eight broad suggestions, of which six will be discussed.272
The first recommendation is for the EPA to make environmental equity a
priority. Specifically, the Report calls on the Agency managers and staff to make
themselves "aware of the issues and tools to identify and address inequities in
risk." The Report indicates that an increase in resources dedicated to
environmental equity would encourage the EPA staff and other private
organizations to follow the Equity Report's recommendations. Toward this end,
the Report suggests that top agency managers make clear statements to EPA
staff about the Agency's concern for environmental equity. Similarly, Agency
managers could inform outside groups that environmental equity should be
given greater importance.273
The Equity Report secondly recommends the establishment of an
information base on income, race, and assessment of risks. The Report claims
that more data are needed to create more objective ways to distribute
environmental risks.274 Time and again, the Report itself qualified many of its
findings because of the lack of information.275
The Report provided some specific examples of how the EPA could
establish the information base. Records on environmental exposures and health
effects could acknowledge and deliberate race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic
status "in study design and implementation." Also, essential attributes such as
race, ethnicity, and class could be distinguished with the purpose of diminishing
2 7 2The remaining two will be discussed in footnotes.
27 3 EPA EQUITY REPORT, supra note 13, at 25-26.
2741d. at 26.
2 7 5 See, e.g., id. at 12-13 (discussing differences of disease and death rates between the races:
'There are also limited data to explain environmental contributions to these differences." Id. at
17-18 (discussing environmental and health data are not collected and analyzed where health
risks are posed by environmental burdens).
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disproportionate impact. The EPA also could create an extensive "research plan"
for gathering data and establishing new risk assessment procedures. Finally, the
Report suggests that the EPA could make demographic information and support
services available to all Agency offices.276
The next recommendation produced by the Equity Report is for the EPA
to integrate recognition of environmental equity into the risk assessment
processes. The Report noted that the EPA should rework its assessment
methods to make certain there is "better characterization of risk across
populations, communities or geographic areas." The Report, however, indicates
that because information on race and income is not "necessary or appropriate"
for all risk assessments, the EPA should decide in what instances demographic
information should be considered in risk assessments.277 Nonetheless, the
Report notes that:
[while] [s]ome might observe that risk calculations are race and income
neutral and that risk assessments should only include information on
pollutants ... the Workgroup has concluded that in studying aggregate
risks, high risk populations in some cases have been overlooked. By
collecting information on race and income, the EPA can gain a more
accurate picture of risks to all population groups.278
In particular, the Report indicates that the EPA could incorporate environmental
equity in risk assessments by following several measures. First, the Agency
could specify that quantitative risk assessments contain allocation of
environmental burdens across different categories of exposed populations, using
census data on age, gender, income level, and race. The EPA also could
concentrate on reforming existing methods and developing newer ones for
2 76 1d. at 26.
2 771d. at 26.
278Id. at 27.
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assessing risk from various chemicals and different sources "within and across
environmental media." Thus, the Report suggests that the Agency could
formulate the "Maximally Exposed Community Concept", including "cumulative
exposures; multiple exposures; increased susceptibility, [and] the effects of
multiple/different pathways of exposure." The EPA, "where feasible and
appropriate," could identify and describe the population living in areas with
environmental risk exposures. Finally, the Report suggests that national,
regional, and state comparative risk studies could be extended to include
aggregate data on individual population groups.279
Another recommendation is for the Agency to locate and target ways to
lower high concentrations of risks on particular population groups. For
example, the Report mentions that the EPA could enhance its enforcement
prioritization methods to target high risk populations such that enforcement
efforts would be focused on the most exposed and vulnerable groups. The EPA
also could carry out "show-case urban projects" where the Agency would
concentrate on "marshalling targeted prevention, remediation, education and
outreach" mechanisms on minority and low income communities. 280
The next recommendation is for the EPA to look over and modify its
permit, grant, monitoring and enforcement schemes "to address high
2791d. Other recommendations on how the EPA could incorporate environmental equity
considerations into the risk assessment process include: continue development and refinement
of data on exposure factors, especially where exposure factors affect population groups; and
studying ways to assess environmental risks to native Americans. Id.
280 1d. at 28. The Report also suggests that the EPA could instigate "targeted geographic
initiatives" in areas where many are exposed to various pollutants. These possible target areas
include: the Mississippi River between Baton rouge, Louisiana, and New Orleans; the Mexico-
U.S. border; New York City, New York; and East Los Angeles, California. Id.
The Report further recommends that the EPA should determine and weigh the
allocation of anticipated risk decreases in major rulemakings and Agency actions "where
appropriate." Costs and benefits analysis should include a population distribution analysis. For
instance, the EPA "could conduct 3 to 4 pilot environmental equity analysis based on a set of
prospective major rules for which such an analysis is feasible and will not unduly delay the
rule." Id. Also, the Agency could create risk management guidelines requiring recognition
and assessment of environmental equity when making regulatory decisions. Id.
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concentrations of risk" in minority and poor communities.281 The Report notes
that because state and local governments wield most of the authority over many
environmental programs, the Agency should underscore its concerns about
environmental equity. Nevertheless, the Report recognizes the potential pitfalls
of taking environmental equity to its extreme:
In certain cases, these economic effects [such as increased costs of goods
and services, and job loss, plant re-locations and plant closures resulting
from environmental regulatory actions,] to selected communities may
exceed the benefit of environmental controls, even though the
environmental control renders net benefits the population as a whole.282
For this reason the Report provides several specific suggestions that attempt to
balance the need for environmental equity against costs imposed on account of
environmentally equitable decisions.
First, the Report suggests that the EPA could include language in permit,
grant and enforcement guidelines placing high importance on risk populations.
Secondly, the Agency could also require its headquarters and regional offices to
review their activities and submit to the Administrator of the EPA a plan of how
they will achieve equity goals. These environmental equity goals also could be
part of the strategic planning and budget process. Third, the EPA could examine
the possibility of requiring a determination of cumulative impacts and risks
associated with new or growing RCRA facilities. Fourth, the Agency could
examine the execution of the Clean Air Act of 1990 to make certain that the
adjustable provisions in the Bill do not increase pollution in poor or minority
areas. Fifth, the EPA could determine the projected inequities produced by
increased transportation user fees (provided by the Clean Air Act of 1990) and
2811d.
2821d. at 29.
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seek solutions that would both diminish the likely inequities and attain the goal
of traffic reduction.283
The final recommendation the Equity Report provides is for the EPA to
extend and enhance the "level and forms" it uses to communicate with minority
and poor communities, and to multiply efforts to engage these groups in
environmental policy-making. Toward this end, the Report provides seven
suggestions.
The first suggestion is for the Agency to look for new ways to assist
minority and low income communities in retaining technical support in order to
comprehend and partake in decisions about environmental issues at the local
level.284 The EPA also could help fund university-based groups conducting
research and education activities related to environmental equity. Third, the
Agency could enhance the distribution of environmental education literature and
other communications for minority and poor communities. Fourth, each EPA
regional office could create "two-way communication programs."285 Fifth, the
Report suggests that the EPA provide guidance for its staff in communicating
with racial ethnic, and poor communities. Sixth, the EPA could appoint "outreach
representatives" for racial, ethnic, and poor communities in each of its regional
283Id.
2 84 Id. at 30.
2 85 1d. at 30. An example of such a communication program is Region I's Urban
Environmental Initiative and Region III's Outreach program in ethnic communities. The Urban
Environmental Initiative is an endeavor to create a two-way communication strategy. The goal
of this project is to establish an "environmental agenda" for the Boston area "which includes the
concerns of racial minority communities" EPA EQUITY REPORT, supra note 77, at 54.
The Outreach Program (listed as the "Multi-Cultural Participation in the Chesapeake
Bay Program" in the Equity Report) is an attempt to "broaden public participation and
involvement in the restoration of the [Chesapeake] Bay." The program focuses on creating
public information materials and education programs with a broad appeal and which promote
public participation. Id. at 57.
. I V._, , . _ _ 96
offices. Finally, the EPA could provide its published materials in languages other
than English.286
Although various commentators have proposed ways to distribute
environmental risks more equitably across race and income groups, they
provide few details as to how this may be accomplished. There are other
weaknesses as well, which are discussed below.
F. Critique
1. Challenging Siting Decisions in the Courts
Effecting environmental equity through litigation is inefficient and
unpredictable: it removes decision-making from professionals, such as land use
planners, technicians, and public officials, and places it in the hands of jury
members who generally are inexperienced in the siting of facilities. Jurists are
forced to second-guess siting decisions and speculate motivations of state actors,
especially in equal protection cases.287 Court costs alone can consume
tremendous amounts of financial resources, as well as time.288 Even if a case is
28 6 EPA EQUITY REPORT, supra note 13, at 30. The eighth broad recommendation is for the
EPA to institute mechanisms to guarantee that environmental equity concerns become part of
the Agency's long-term planning and operations. Id. Some specific measures to promote this
suggestion include incorporating environmental equity in strategic planning and budgeting
processes. The EPA also could create a policy statement on "environmental discrimination," and
could start an external "Environmental Equity Advisory Committee." Furthermore, the EPA
could maintain the Equity Workgroup, complete with a staff and resources needed to execute
the recommendations of the Equity Report. Finally, the EPA could allow the workgroup to
carry out a complete analysis of each recommendation to determine its impact and to confirm
viable goals and deadlines. Id. at 30-31.
287See generally R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144 (1991), aff'd, No. 91-2144, 1992 U.S.
App. LEXIS 2672 (4th Cir. Oct. 15, 1992) (court held no violation of the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment in the siting of a hazardous waste facility because the plaintiffs
failed to prove discriminatory intent); East-Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon Bibb
Planning and Zoning Comm'n, 896 F.2d 1264 (11th Cir. 1989) (same); Bean v. Southwestern
Waste Management Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673 (1979) (same).
2 8 8 Forcing changes in the siting process through legal action would proceed in a piecemeal
fashion. Because legal challenges usually occur on a site-by-site basis, it would take the efforts
of many litigants across different states to have an impact on a national scale. State courts have
jurisdiction over only courts within each respective state. For example, a state court decision in
Texas would have an impact in the courts of surrounding states only to the extent of its
persuasiveness. States are not compelled to follow legal precedents of other states.
Page 
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resolved at trial, the decision can always be appealed by either party and
reversed in appellate court. The delay created by legal action compounds costs
already incurred during pre-litigation activities, such as the preliminary siting
procedures, environmental impacts studies, and perhaps the purchasing of real
estate. The unpredictable demise of a project because of litigation has
repercussions on third party beneficiaries who were expecting a facility. These
third parties include industries relying on the disposal facility, construction firms
and related businesses, local businesses, and state or local governments that
anticipated property tax revenues.
In addition to the inefficiency of litigation is the added uncertainty of
success for the plaintiff who seeks to challenge a proposed site. The theories of
law on which a case is based, such as nuisance, may not be fruitful court.289
Obtaining an injunction under a nuisance theory, for example, would require the
plaintiff to establish that a tort had been committed, that no adequate remedy at
law is available, and that "the balance of social equities favors granting an
injunction."290 Unless the state in which the cause of action is brought recognizes
the anticipatory nuisance doctrine (which allows a cause of action premised on
the chance of harm), the plaintiff would not be able to show a tort in fact because
the facility would not yet exist.
Although the courts offer a forum for addressing compelling social
problems, such as the equal distribution of hazardous waste facilities, they do so
with high financial costs and great risks. Nevertheless, the benefits of
challenging siting decisions in court include raising public awareness of discreet
social problems, and, in some instances, establishing legal precedents for future
28 9The doctrine to serve theory, though compelling, only "has strong implications for a party
seeking to challenge the siting of a hazardous waste facility." Tsao, supra note 6, at 390
(emphasis added). It is unclear if the doctrine would withstand a test in court.
2 90Id. at 384 (citing Olsen v. City of Baton Rouge, 247 So. 2d 889, 894 (La. Ct. Ap. 1971)).
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plaintiffs. A court of law is both a convenient and proper forum where citizens
can seek equal protection of federal, state, and local laws. Still, the use of the
judiciary to promote environmental equity is inefficient, because of case-by-case
resolution of problems, and not very effective in supporting equal protection
claims.291
2. Legislative Approaches
The proposed Environmental Justice Act of 1993292 and the federal equity
mandate293 are notable models for legislation concerning environmental equity.
Each proposes to address environmental equity at the federal level by making
equal distribution of environmental risks a national priority and objective. The
proposals, however, have several weaknesses.
The proposed Bill's strength also is its main drawback: it is broad enough
to cover most every aspect of the distribution of environmental risks, but
provides few details as to how its policies are to be implemented. The Bill
provides for the collection of information with respect to race, income, and toxic
chemicals, for the purpose of determining the effects of chemical releases on
human health and the demographics of high environmental impact areas.
Without such information, the current limited body of data on race, income, and
environmental risks will continue to impede progress toward environmental
equity.
2 9 1E.g., R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144 (1991), aff'd, No. 91-2144, 1992 U.S. App.
LEXIS 2672 (4th Cir. Oct. 15, 1992) (court held no violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment in the siting of a hazardous waste facility because the plaintiffs failed to
prove discriminatory intent); East-Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon Bibb Planning
and Zoning Comm'n, 896 F.2d 1264 (11th Cir. 1989) (same); Bean v. Southwestern Waste
Management Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673 (1979) (same). See, supra, note 194 and accompanying
text.
2 9 2 See supra notes 214-29 and accompanying text.
2 9 3 Supra notes 230-32 and accompanying text.
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The Bill also is ambitious in its proposal to engage many federal agencies
in the effort to distribute environmental risks more equally. In addition to
agencies dealing directly with environmental issues, such as the EPA, the Agency
for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, the National Institute for
Environmental Health Sciences, and National Center for Health Statistics, the Bill
also speaks of the Bureau of the Census, the Secretary of Health and Human
Services, the Secretary of Labor, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the United States
Commission on Civil Rights, as well as the U.S. President and Congress. By
engaging this diverse group of agencies, institutions, and public servants, the Bill
recognizes the complex nature of environmental equity. It is significant that the
Commission on Civil Rights is discussed in the same section as other more
environmentally oriented institutions; this juxtaposition signals a movement
towards from treating environmentalism as comparable to civil rights.
The Bill, however, fails to provide specific details as to how environmental
risks are to be determined or distributed more equitably. Administrative and
legislative remedial and preventative measures extend only to reductions or
imposition of additional regulatory requirements and restrictions on chemical
releases in environmental high impact areas.294
As to the siting of facilities, the Senate version only indicates that
regulations "requiring a net reduction in the release of any toxic chemical
determined to cause such significant adverse impacts on human health in that
area" be applicable "to any Federal permit for construction or modification of a
toxic chemical facility in that area."295 Exactly what is meant by "significant
adverse impact on human health" and an "acute and chronic" effect on human
health is never identified. Also, it remains unclear if regulations requiring a net
294See S. 1161 § 5(d)(4)(A)-(C) and § 6.
295S. 1161 § 6.
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reduction of toxic chemicals include laws affecting siting decisions. Even if the
intent is to influence the siting of hazardous waste facilities, the Bill offers no
guidance to states containing EHIAs for siting facilities in a manner consistent
with the Act's purposes. Above all, the Bill would affect only federal facilities,
thereby excluding all private, municipal, and state projects.
By contrast, the proposed federal equity mandate takes the issue to court:
the mandate would alleviate the difficult burden of showing intent in federal
equal protection suits. In so doing, plaintiffs alleging discrimination in the siting
process perhaps would achieve higher success rates in litigation. The probable
outcome, however, would be an increase in legal challenges of siting decisions.
Although legal victories may serve to discourage the siting of facilities in
minority communities, the siting decisions would be based on concerns for
litigation rather than other more objective criteria such as soil permeability and
transportation routes. Also, as discussed earlier, relying on the courts for
remedies is inefficient and unpredictable.
Amending the national policy enunciated in RCRA to include a call for
environmental equity296 has potential to promote environmental equity. This
recommendation can have an impact on how the federal government prioritizes
its environmental agenda. For example, in addition to protecting health and
environment, a change in policy could translate to more attention to how certain
populations are affected by toxic chemicals and hazardous waste facilities. This
would represent a step toward understanding how environmental burdens
impact all categories of persons.
The recommendation for states to make environmental equity a priority
would also be a positive step toward more equitable distribution of
2 9 6 See supra notes 233-34 and accompanying text for discussion of this proposal.
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environmental risks. Using the super review and site designation approaches in
tandem is realistic because states already have working models of both siting
strategies. The recommendation, however, does not describe how states would
go about making environmental equity a priority. Implementation would be a
matter of consolidating and codifying the two approaches. The next step,
therefore, would be to draft a model siting statute taking these suggestions into
account.
3. Grass-Roots Activism and Local Participation
The recommendation that the unequal distribution of environmental risks
should be challenged by grass-roots activism and local participation is effective
only to the extent that community members are willing and able to cooperate.
Otherwise, the silence of a contingency may convey a false message that it is
willing to assume greater environmental burdens. Unequal distribution of
environmental risks because the facilities would gravitate toward easier siting
targets.
An increase in local participation in the siting process may not necessarily
result in "fairer" siting decisions. The perception of "fairness" may be enhanced
simply because there was input from the host community. What remains
unclear, however, is if the initial selection of the potential host community
represents a decision based on environmental equity. Arguably, minority
communities could participate more in the setting of siting policies, design of
state programs, and negotiations over compensation. Additionally, the
effectiveness of the participation could be improved by government-funded help
from legal and technical experts. These approaches, however, do not address the
issue of whether the community already is subject to hazardous waste facilities
(or other environmentally risky facilities), or if there are other more equitable
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siting options. Local participation perhaps only contributes to fairer
compensation packages, not overall siting decisions.
Even if potential host communities were notified of the prospect of
hosting a toxic chemical waste facility at the beginning of the permitting process,
the final siting decision may not be environmentally fair. Early notification
would give vocal communities a head start in building local opposition, and
would not address the concern that other less vocal communities would emerge
as more viable targets. Thus, a siting decision may be based more on whatever
community raised an obstacle to siting a facility, rather than concerns for
environmental equity. The net result probably would be a bid for which
community could conjure the least local opposition. In the event that
communities wanted the facility in exchange for a compensation package, the
reverse bidding process could result in communities lowering their price in order
to secure the facility. Thus, the chances for under-compensation would be
greater.
4. Geographic Fairness
Although the goals of geographic fairness would produce equal
distribution of hazardous waste facilities across all communities, it would not
necessarily address environmental equity. Poor and minority communities still
would be vulnerable even though no one community would host many facilities.
For example, if a state were to site three different facilities pursuant to
geographic fairness, three different hosts would get the facilities. But under the
same approach, it is conceivable that all three different communities could be
minority or poor areas. In this manner, the facilities still would be sited
inequitably, with respect to race and income, in spite of being geographically fair.
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Nevertheless, geographic fairness is a notable concept because it would promote
a certain degree of equality in facility siting.
5. Comprehensive Approach
The comprehensive approach to distributing environmental risks more
equitably, such as the wide range of suggestions provided in the Commission
Report and EPA Equity Report, is appropriate in the sense that any move in the
direction of environmental equity must involve many persons and institutions,
both public and private. Although advocating environmental policies premised
on the equal distribution of risks is a positive step, the mechanics on how such
distribution is to be done are perhaps more challenging and problematic. Thus,
it is not surprising that many of the suggestions of the Commission Report and
the Equity Report are vague and sometimes unrealistic.
For example, the Commission's call for addressing issues related to the
disproportionate number of hazardous waste facilities in minority and poor
communities is ambiguous given the complex nature of siting processes. Also,
the Commission's suggestion that health assessments of Superfund sites be
taken is unrealistic given the fact that there are so many such sites. The
resources that it would take to complete a project of such scale are probably not
available.
The EPA Equity Report similarly is unclear and hesitant on some of its
calls. For instance, the Report recommends studies to collect data on race, age,
gender, and ethnicity "to the degree feasible". Also, the Report qualifies its
charge for "projected risk assessment" by indicating that it should be done only
"where appropriate" because, the Report claims, it "will not be necessary or
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appropriate in all cases." Exactly what is considered "necessary" and
"appropriate" is not clarified, however.297
In summary, challenging siting decisions in court is inefficient and
unpredictable. Legislative approaches, on the other hand, are more promising.
The proposed Environmental Justice Act of 1993, although vague and perhaps
unrealistic, does call for the gathering of data on the relationship between
hazardous wastes, race, and income. It also holds the equal distribution of
environmental risks partly as a civil rights issue. Amending the national policy
enunciated in RCRA to reflect a concern for equal distribution of environmental
risks across race and income can instigate changes throughout federal laws that
may promote environmental equity. At the state legislative level, state siting
statutes that site facilities pursuant to a hybrid of the site designation and super
review models may be an effective way to site future facilities more equally
across race and income groups. Similarly, grass-roots activism and improved
local participation in siting processes are necessary for fairer and more legitimate
siting results. Without input from local residents, views and concerns not
otherwise factored into siting decisions will not be heard thereby intensifying
local opposition and creating distrust of public officials, developers and the siting
process itself. Finally, a comprehensive approach to furthering environmental
equity is preferable, as most of the proposals discuss can contribute to
eliminating disparities in the way hazardous waste facilities are sited and how
associated risks are distributed.
2 9 7 Mohai, supra note 214, at 2-4.
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The broad range of recommendations discussed in Part V offers few
specifics on how to actually implement changes current environmental laws and
policies to effect environmental equity. Nevertheless, the suggestions are helpful
in articulating conceptual guidelines, discussed in Part VI, to create a siting
mechanism that locates facilities in a more environmentally equitable manner.
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VI. A NEW SMNG PROPOSAL
By taking into account both the strengths and weaknesses of the existing state
models and the recommendations of commentators, it is possible to establish
basic guidelines to shape an environmentally equitable siting model. Part VI
discusses and presents such guidelines in the form of a proposed siting scheme.
The proposal is intended to address issues of environmental equity associated
with the siting of hazardous waste facilities.
Part VI begins with a discussion of the goals of the proposal and several
basic assumptions which are necessary to simplify the complex issues
surrounding the siting of hazardous waste facilities with respect to
environmental equity. A quick overview of the entire proposed siting scheme is
then provided in order to place subsequent discussions into context. Optimal
siting criteria, a proposed point system, and trade-offs inherent in promoting
environmentally equitable siting practices are then discussed. Public
participation in the proposed siting process is described and technical assistance
aspects of the proposed siting scheme are explained. Part VI concludes with a
critique of the proposed siting model and a brief discussion on how to measure
the proposed model's success if it were ever to be implemented.
A. Goals and Preliminary Assumptions
Given the evidence of the disproportionate placement of hazardous waste
facilities in minority and poor communities, the goal of the proposed siting
model is to site hazardous waste facilities in an equitable manner with respect to
race and income. In light of the many complex issues related to the siting of
hazardous waste facilities, several assumptions are used as the basis for the
model.
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The proposal is intended to be used by a state government. The proposal
assumes that any state or governmental entity under which the proposed siting
model would operate already possesses the institutional infrastructure to
implement the scheme. For instance, the proposal assumes that a state
environmental protection agency exists. Also, the proposal presumes that
technical staff are readily available. The proposed model presumes that the state
has a plan to reduce hazardous waste generation, that a pre-treatment
requirement exists (unless pre-treatment is unavailable), that there is a state
waste management plan in effect (one that includes a provision for interstate
cooperation), and that regional and integrated facilities are preferable to localized
facilities.298 The proposal assumes that a needs assessment -- an evaluation of
the amount of waste produced in the state compared to the amount of
hazardous waste treatment capacity already existing in the state -- has been
conducted, with a determination that a shortfall in capacity exists. It also
assumes that the state already knows with certainty the type of facility needed,
including design specifications and technologies to be used. Additionally, the
proposal treats site selection as separate from facility permitting and assumes
that a hazardous waste facility permit process already exists. Finally, the
proposal assumes only one site is needed to meet the shortfall; three candidate
sites is a large enough range from which to select the final site; and the entire site
selection process, including nominations, is confined within certain specific dates.
B. Procedural Guidelines
The first basic guideline of the model is the state guarantees no
community has a disproportionately high number of facilities.299 Accordingly,
2 98 See Canter, supra note 99, at 452-53.
29 9 See Laws & Susskind, supra note 75, at 39 (discussing Credo element number 13: "Work
for geographic fairness").
Part VI: Proposed Siting Model Page 108
the proposed siting model utilizes the site designation scheme, previously
discussed in Part IV.B.2. The site designation approach is preferred because it
affords state officials the ability to determine state-wide needs, the potential to
select sites from a greater range of locations, and the power to prevent
communities from hosting a high number of facilities. 30 0 In this manner, the
state can make certain that no particular area becomes overwhelmed with
facilities.
Another critical guideline for the scheme is that the state commits itself to
reimbursing communities for any costs incurred because of the hazardous waste
facility.301 Each community in which a candidate site is located is guaranteed a
minimum package of compensation to make up for all financial costs potentially
incurred because of a facility. 302 The purpose of this guideline is threefold. First
it mitigates against the community absorbing unfair costs when other
communities (remote to the facility) enjoy the facility's benefits yet do not pay
the price as host. Second, it alleviates typical negative public perception of
hazardous waste facilities by making host status a lucrative venture. Finally, it
represents a measure of good faith and equal dealing on the state's part. If the
host community sees that the state readily acknowledges that hosts deserve
special treatment, this could minimize resentment among residents that would
otherwise occur if the state were reluctant to show a willingness to appease. The
30 0 See supra notes 264-66 and discussion of geographic fairness. See also Godsil, supra note
77, at 406 (discussing the relative benefits of the site designation approach). Under the
proposal, the state legislature determines what constitutes a "high" number of facilities.3 0 1See Laws & Susskind, supra note 75, at 37 (discussing Credo element number 7: "Fully
compensate all negative impacts of a facility"; and number 10: "Make the host community
better off.").
30 2 A compensation package might include: state technical assistance grants; direct
compensation from the developer; preference for state and federal funds to local governments;
financing service extensions; emergency cleanup funds; purchase of emergency equipment,
training of emergency personnel; limited local government liability; parks and buffer zones;
conditionally guaranteed property values. O'HARE, supra note 83, at 71-73; Canter, supra note
99, at 453.
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state and local communities are involved throughout the siting process. The
scheme is outlined in Figure B.
Consistent with the site designation approach, the siting scheme generates
a list of viable sites for a hazardous waste facility whether or not a proposal for a
facility exists (assuming that there is a projected need for a facility and that the
facility type is known with certainty). This guarantees that several sites are
considered before any one final site is selected. This also allows the state more
control over what sites are placed under consideration, rather than giving
private developers or local communities a monopoly over site proposals. Like
the site designation model, sites either are selected by a technical review board
(TRB), volunteered by communities, or proposed by private developers.
Proposed sites are to move through various phases, progressing only after
meeting various thresholds. The first status, already mentioned, is proposed site;
the second status is potential candidate site; the third status is candidate site; and,
finally, the last status is final site. Each status will be discussed shortly.
The purpose of the TRB would be to ensure that technical aspect of the
proposed process are competently and thoroughly examined. The TRB is
composed of professionals in various fields such as chemistry, biology, city
planning, public health, and law. The exact number of TRB members and
composition are to determined by the given state legislature. The state
legislature also is to establish how members are selected.
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1. PROPOSED SITE STATUS
" communities may volunteer
" state may select
e developers may propose
What Happens?
1. LRBs are created
2. LRBs and TRB review
standard criteria
3. joint public hearings held
4. LRB and TRB compare &
prepare site assess't reports
Guidelines:
a. Race, income, and history
of past siting decisions are
considered (criteria)
b. Cap on number of facilities
in a community
c. technical assistance grants
d. early public participation
through LRB and public
comment
4. FINAL SITE STATUS
e LRB continues representing
host community
e SRB contains members from
host community
What happens?
1. Negotiations for
compensation package
continue
2. binding arbitration, if
necessary
Guidelines:
a. technical assistance grants
b. full compensation for costs
and risks
c. public participation through
LRB and SRB
Legend:
LRB = local review board
TRB = technical review board
SRB = state review board
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Figure B: Proposed Siting Model
SITE ASSESSMENT REPT
1. LRB and TRB
recommend potential site
status
2. LRB and TRB do not
recommend potential site
status -- STOP.
3. LRB and TRB submit
diff't recommendations
Not selected by SRB --
STOP
2.POTENTIAL SITE STATUS
* SRB contains members from
potential site host
What Happens?
1. SRB reviews site assessment
reports
2. SRB considers different
recommendations
3. SRB conducts own review of
standard criteria
4. public hearings on SRB's
preliminary findings
5. SRB determines which sites
attain candidate site status
Guidelines:
a. Race, income, and history of
past siting decisions are
considered (criteria)
b. Cap on number of facilities
in a community
c. LRB and TRB reports
considered
d. technical assistance grants
e. public participation through
LRB, SRB, and pub. com't
3.CANDIDATE SITE STAT'S
" LRBs continue representation
e SRB contains members from
candidate site hosts
What Happens?
1. SRB solicits proposals from
developers for facilities
2. candidate sites are weighed
against each other to determine
which is best as final site
3. candidate sites are weighed
against developer proposals
4. candidate site LRB's begin
negotiations with developer(s)
5. SRB makes final site selectior
Guidelines:
a. inventory of sites
b. LRB and TRB reports
considered
c. race, income and history
considered (criteria)
d. cap on number of facilities in
a community
e. technical assistance grants
f. public participation through
LRB, SRB, and public comment
1.Selection by 2.Not selected
SRB 
-- STOP J
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Another guideline of the proposal is that the state provides technical assistance grants
to interested parties when necessary. The grants may be used to hire scientists,
lawyers, and other technical professionals needed to assist the communities in
participating meaningfully in the site selection process.303 The grants provide
resources necessary to allow parties interested in contributing to the process who
otherwise would not have the means to do so.
Another important guideline is that the state institutionalize local
participation and input by creating a community committee (composed of local
participants) with influence and power equal to that of the TRB. Once a location
is selected as a proposed site, a local review board (LRB) is created. The LRB is
composed of persons and professionals from the counties and municipalities
(referred to roughly as the community) in which the proposed sites are located
and from those counties and municipalities which lie adjacent to the possible
sites. Depending on the number of proposed sites, there may be many more
than three LRBs, each representing a different potential candidate site. The
purpose of the LRB is to provide direct representation of the community(ies) in
which the proposed site lies during the site selection process. Like the TRB, the
number of LRB members is to be determined by the given state legislature.
Although the legislature also will establish how members of the LRB are selected,
the selection process must place actual selection in the hands of local leaders and
elected officials and its composition must reflect the racial composition of the
community.
Both the TRB and LRB review siting criteria and decide whether the
proposed site meets the criteria. Though there are to be standard siting
303The local site review committee is qualified to receive such grants. It also has the
authority to share the grants with other parties interested in contributing to the siting process
but do not have the resources to do so. See infra Part E for more on technical assistance grants.
Part VI: Proposed Siting Model Page 112
criteria, 304 the TRB and LRB have the authority to consider other factors they
deem relevant.305. The two make independent reviews and reach independent
conclusions based on their findings, and each prepare a preliminary site
assessment report. The TRB and LRB hold joint public hearings and receive public
comments on the preliminary site assessment reports. After public hearings and
after a public comment period, the TRB and LRB each prepare a final site
assessment report taking into account comments received from the public.
The purpose for creating two potentially adversarial entities, the TRB and
LRB, is to ensure that both technical aspects of facility siting and local concerns
are advanced. The LRB serves as chief advocate for the potential host
community while the TRB focuses on more technical considerations. The TRB
and LRB may, however, work together and share their individual findings if they
so choose. The intent behind their independent status is to give each the
freedom of producing unrestrained contradictory reports if they so chose.
After both the TRB and LRB establish appropriate siting criteria, in
addition to the standard criteria, and conduct a preliminary assessment of
whether the proposed site meets the criteria, the boards meet to discuss their
final site assessment reports, including differences in siting criteria and final
recommendations for the proposed site, and to produce a single, joint report. If
the boards emphasize different criteria and reach different conclusions about the
suitability of the proposed site, they try to integrate their site assessment reports
to the fullest extent possible. This may be done by the TRB and LRB reviewing
the other's report to see how and why they differ. This could reveal flaws or
304The standard criteria are categorized roughly into three groups: hard-technical criteria,
soft-technical criteria, and non-technical criteria. These will be discussed in Part C.1 of this part.
305The standard siting criteria, however, are to be determined by the given state
legislature. Eventually, both boards are to make one proposal to the state siting board (SRB). It
is the SRB that selects the three final candidate sites and decides which particular candidate site
eventually receives the hazardous waste facility.
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factors not considered by each. If they are unable to produce one consistent site
assessment report or cannot agree on the suitability of a particular proposed site,
the joint proposal is submitted to the state review board (SRB) 306 where final
judgement on suitability is made. If the TRB and LRB agree on the criteria and
recommendation, and if the recommendation is that the proposed site is
appropriate as a potential candidate site, the SRB takes that recommendation into
strong consideration before selecting the final three candidate sites. If both the
TRB and LRB recommend that a proposed site not be considered as a potential
candidate site, the site is removed from the selection process.
All potential candidate sites that eventually are submitted to the SRB are
subject to another review by the SRB. Again, the SRB is to place much emphasis
on site assessment reports submitted by the TRB and LRB in which both agree
that the potential candidate site would make a suitable candidate site. If a
proposal contains inconsistent recommendations, as in the case were the TRB
and LRB do not agree on siting criteria and site suitability, the SRB conducts its
own analysis to determine siting criteria and suitability of the site. Still, the final
decision-making process would take into consideration the TRB and LRB
findings. The SRB's decision at this point is either to consider the disputed site as
a potential candidate site or to eliminate the site from the selection process.
After the SRB determines which of the proposed sites are suitable as
potential candidate sites, it subjects the preliminary list, along with its findings to
a public hearing and comment period. At this point, the SRB receives comments
306The SRB is composed of scientists and professionals and representatives from across the
state and candidate site communities. The given state legislature determines the number of
SRB members as well as its composition. Regardless of the number and composition of the SRB,
it still must have at least two members from communities which contain a proposed site. These
members revolve in order to accommodate all the proposed site communities. The purpose of
the SRB is to provide the siting process an oversight entity with authority over the entire siting
process and final site selection. See Part D infra for more information on the SRB.
Part VI: Proposed Siting Model Page 114
and concerns from the public before proceeding to the next step of determining
which sites are to become the three candidate sites.
When determining which of the potential candidate site are to be
candidate sites, the SRB takes into consideration its own findings about the
criteria and suitability of the site, the final site assessment reports of the TRB and
LRB, and public comments and concerns. Most importantly, however, the SRB is
to consider the percentage of minority and poor persons in the proposed sites in
order to avoid selecting all candidate sites with high percentages of poor and
minorities. These percentages are weighed on a level comparable to other
critical factors such as geologic qualities of the sites. The SRB selects the top three
choices as candidate sites pursuant to a point system, discussed below.307
After candidate sites are selected, the SRB either may solicit proposals
from developers for a hazardous waste facility or review proposals that already
have been submitted by developers. In any event, applications for a permit to
construct a hazardous waste facility are not reviewed until all three candidate
sites are selected (except where a developer already has a particular site in mind,
in which case the site would be considered a proposed site) in order to prevent
the developer from influencing which sites attain proposed and candidate site
status. Other merits of the developer's proposal, however, are not considered
until after the candidate sites are selected. As mentioned earlier, the proposal
assumes that appropriate technologies and facility type are known with enough
certainty that standard criteria can be identified.308
Once all proposed sites either have been eliminated or are selected as
candidate sites, the board reviews hazardous waste facility proposals. In case the
30 7 The SRB would allocate points at this stage of the process, based on its own findings and
those of the TRB and LRB. This is discussed further in Part VI.C.
3 8Laws and Susskind indicate that may qualities of a specific site can be evaluated only
with respect to a particular technology. Laws & Susskind, supra note 75, at 32.
Part VI: Proposed Siting Model Page 115
facility permitting process did not weigh facility-specific considerations revealed
by the facility permitting process,309 the SRB subjects candidate sites to another
analysis to determine which of the three alternative sites would serve best as the
final site.310 At the same time, the LRBs of the candidate sites begin negotiations
with the developer to determine the compensation package. Based on the SRB's
analysis and the results of community-developer negotiations, the SRB selects
the final site. Negotiations between the LRB of the final site and the developer
continue until they reach an agreement over a compensation package. If they
are unable to agree on a compensation package, the parties engage in arbitration
to facilitate the process. 311 The results of the arbitration would become binding.
C. Siting Criteria and Point System
The procedural steps of the proposed siting scheme are in many respects
similar to other siting processes that are modeled after the site designation
approach. The key to ensuring environmental equity, however, is not only
identifying siting criteria that screen out sites in communities with a majority
population of minorities or low-income persons when the community is already
burdened with other hazardous waste facilities, but also describing how such
criteria are to be utilized. Further, a point system to place emphasis on critical
siting criteria is one possible way to rank suitability of sites.
309The facility permitting process is assumed to exist already and is to be a process, to a
certain extent, independent of the site selection process, up until final site selection.
3 10Some state statutes require the consideration of alternative sites as part of the final site
selection process. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 455B.448(1)(k) (West 1990).
3 11The process of arbitration "includes the submission of [the] dispute to a third party who
renders a decision after hearing arguments and reviewing evidence. It is less formal and less
complex and often can be concluded more quickly than court proceedings. In its most common
form, binding arbitration, the parties select the arbitrator and are bound by the decision, either
by prior agreement or by statute." NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, PATHS
TO JUSTICE: MAJOR PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1983), in
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATED, SOURCEBOOK: FEDERAL AGENCY
USE OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 5-47 (1987), reprinted in PLATER, supra note 99, at
982.
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1. Criteria312
As with most existing state siting schemes, there are several basic siting
criteria. These are categorized into three types: hard-technical criteria, soft-
technical criteria and non-technical criteria. Hard-technical considerations are
those which can be quantified or described by way of scientific analysis, or are
readily discernable. Soft-technical criteria, on the other hand, are those which
require more subjective analysis, though are based on statistical and historical
analysis. Although soft-technical criteria have a greater potential to be
discredited than hard technical factors, they are nevertheless important. Non-
technical considerations are those which are not easily identifiable or
quantifiable, but are real.313 Examples include stigma associated with hazardous
waste facility and public fear of unforeseen, even non-existent, risks.
Hard-technical criteria include physical characteristics of the site. Obvious
examples include geologic attributes. The geology of the site, such as the
presence of fault zones and the risk of contamination of ground and surface
waters by leaching and runoff from the facility, should be considered. Natural
hazards to which the area is prone such as flooding, earthquakes, or subsidence
also should be factors. Sites should not be near sources of drinking water
supplies such as reservoirs, lakes, and rivers and their watersheds, aquifers and
their recharge areas. Sites also should not be near fragile land areas such as
wetlands and the shorelines of rivers, lakes, and streams. The presence of rare
3 12 See, e.g., Canter, supra note 99, at 454-55 and IOWA CODE ANN. § 455B.448 (West 1990)
for a list of general siting criteria. Because "the selection of a site is ... tied closely to the choice
of technology" the thesis assumes that the standard criteria are appropriate for the facility the
state deems necessary. See Laws & Susskind, supra note 75, at 32.
3 13 See, e.g., Tarlock, supra note 171, at 451: "The hard, if not impossible, question for
regulators and [treatment, storage, and disposal] facility operators is how nontechnical, but
keenly felt, factors can be rationally brought into the siting process."
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or valuable ecosystems or geologic formations or significant wildlife habit and
with unique scenic or historic areas should be deliberated as well.
Other examples of hard-technical criteria include zoning classification of
proposed sites and the extent to which a proposed site is used for industrial
development. Similarly, local ordinances, permits, or other requirements and
their relationship to the proposed facility are important considerations.
Soft-technical criteria are those which require in-depth analysis of
potential environmental impacts, and potential adverse effects on the economic
development of a host community, and safety, health, and welfare of local
residents. These include projections of transportation routes between a
proposed facility and sources of hazardous waste, and risks associated with
transporting many loads of dangerous substances. Population densities along
transportation routes also would be a consideration. Land uses and the density
of population in areas near the facility would be additional factors to consider.
The risk and effect of possible fires or explosions from improper storage and
disposal methods are also important. The impact of the facility on the operations
and responsibilities of the local government in which the potential site is located
and on other governments near the potential site should also be measured.
Finally, impacts on the economic development of the potential candidate site
community, such as property value, should be considered.
Most importantly with respect to environmental equity considerations,
soft-technical criteria also should include demographic, socio-economic
assessments, and history of past siting results. These assessments are critical to
the screening out of potential candidate sites where minority and low-income
communities are already shouldering relatively high amounts of environmental
burdens and other urban pressure points, such as jails and prisons. History may
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show that series of siting processes produced results that placed facilities in poor
and minority communities, even though individual communities were not
overly burdened with the facilities.
Demographic and socio-economic data to be considered should include
any available data describing demographics at the time of previous site selection
processes, to determine population densities and percentages of minorities and
income groups. Census data could provide an accurate and readily viable source
for this information. A two-tier system of determining minority and income
group percentages should be employed: the first tier would present minority
percentages of a county or municipality, while the second tier would describe the
minority and low-income population percentages of the neighborhood or
community immediately adjacent to potential candidate sites.313a Consideration of
two tiers is necessary to avoid siting facilities in counties or municipalities with
low percentages of minorities and poor persons but where the site itself is in a
predominantly minority and poor community. While the county or municipality
as a whole may not be dominated by a minority and poor population group,
pockets of minority and low-income enclaves may still be vulnerable. The
county or municipality are the appropriate geographic units because they would
be the most affected by risks in terms of providing social services for
communities hosting a facility. Counties or municipalities adjacent to host
communities also would be included in the environmental equity considerations
to account for the possibility of a host community locating the facility in remote
areas bordering a minority or poor community.
313a Terner emphasizes "[tihe importance of selecting an appropriate level of aggregation"
[so as to avoid] the potential [of masking] subtle spatial effects of the distribution of facilities."
Terner, supra note 92, at 22-23.
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Furthermore, soft-technical criteria would include a survey of existing
environmentally and analogously burdensome facilities. These would include
airports, jails and prisons, drug treatment centers, parole offices, and refinery
plants. Facilities that would qualify as burdensome would be determined by the
given state legislature. The survey would be weighed against population density
and minority and poor group percentages. This could establish whether a
particular minority or income group is subject to a disproportionate amount of
risks posed by environmentally hazardous and other undesirable land uses,
relative to the total number of such land uses in that region of the state.
Other soft-technical criteria would include the projected impact of
hazardous waste facilities on public health, especially on the health of
communities immediately surrounding hazardous waste facilities, and the over-
all residents' health of communities near potential candidate sites. These factors
could determine whether the residents of a potential host community are more
susceptible to health risks posed by a hazardous waste facility, in comparison to
national averages for health related standards and guides. Similarly, the
availability of health care and health care facilities to meet the needs of host
communities in the event that hazardous waste facilities have an adverse health
impact on residents should also be considered.
Non-technical considerations include stigma associated with living near a
hazardous waste facility, public fear of unknown and unforeseen risks, even
when such risks do not actually exist, and public perception of the siting process'
fairness or bias. Although determining how to gauge and portray non-technical
criteria is difficult, these criteria nevertheless should be considered because they
represent real concerns to many individuals in the community facing the
possibility of hosting a hazardous waste facility. Such non-technical criteria also
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may account for distrust between siting officials and boards and residents
opposed to hosting a facility. It would be for the state legislature of the given
state to determine precisely how such criteria would be weighed. The non-
technical criteria illustrate the dilemma associated with all three classes of criteria:
how should criteria be scored so as to provide a meaningful and accurate
comprehensive analysis of site suitability? A point system provides one solution.
2. Point System
If a site assessment report of a proposed site were reduced to a simple
formula, it would be:
HARD-TECHNICAL FACTORS + SOFT-TECHNICAL FACTORS + NON-TECHNICAL
FACTORS = SITE ASSESSMENT REPORT.
Assigning actual figures to the criteria discussed above is problematic,
notwithstanding the simplicity of this formula. It would be for the legislature of
the given state to determine exactly how criteria are to be ranked and graded.
Nevertheless, the following is an outline of one possible point system.
Hard-technical criteria would be grouped at least into the following
categories: geologic attributes; zoning classification; and existing land uses. Soft-
technical criteria also would be grouped into at least the following categories:
potential environmental impacts; potential economic impacts; potential health
impacts; population density; population density along transportation routes; tier
one socio-economic composition; tier one minority composition; tier two socio-
economic composition; tier two minority composition; and existing
environmental and analogously burdensome phenomenon (geographic fairness
consideration). Non-technical criteria would be grouped only into one category:
non-technical considerations. The SRB, TRB, and LRB can include additional
categories in the first two groups as they deem appropriate.
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The site assessment reports prepared by the TRB and the LRB, both the
independent reports and the joint reports, would contain scores assigned to each
category. It would be up to the discretion of the TRB and LRB, both individually
and jointly, to decide the score for each category. In any event, equal respect is
to be paid to all three categories; that is, soft-technical criteria such as race,
income, history of past siting practices, and geographic fairness should be given
equal weight as hard-technical criteria. Likewise, the SRB applies the same
respect to all categories when it reviews site assessment reports and, when
necessary, assigns its own scores to the categories. In this manner,
environmental equity considerations will always influence siting results.
Public participation is another important aspect of the siting scheme.
Through public input and cooperation, the state and potential host communities
can attempt to seek consensus, develop trust, and ensure that all criteria are
considered equally.314
D. Public Participation
The proposed siting scheme makes use of several mechanisms to enhance
public participation throughout the process. First, the SRB and LRB contain
representatives from potential and candidate site communities. The
recommendations of the TRB and LRB promote consideration of pertinent issues
both from a technical perspective and local point of view. The proposal also
incorporates public hearings and comment periods to allow interested parties the
opportunity to voice their concerns. These mechanisms will be discussed in turn
below.
314See Laws & Susskind, supra note 75, at 36 discussing the importance of seeking
consensus (Credo element number one) and developing trust (Credo element number two).
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The SRB is a permanent state advisory board, and contains two types of
positions: fixed-term members (five years) and revolving members from local
communities. The fixed-term members includes scientists, lawyers, and
planners. Fixed-term membership on the board maintain continuity even when
other members are replaced. Positions for local representatives revolve so that
all potential host communities have representation on the SRB. For example,
when a given potential candidate site is under review by the SRB, the site's SRB
representatives sit on the board during the deliberations. Whenever the SRB
reviews another proposed candidate site, the revolving membership would
change so as to allow the representatives from that proposed candidate site to
participate in the SRB review, and so forth.
Most importantly, members of the local site review committee (LRB)
should be from the potential host community. The LRB also should contain
scientists and professionals from various disciplines. Members of the LRB also
should include residents who may not necessarily be professionals, but who
nonetheless would like to participate in the siting process. Furthermore, LRB
membership also should include representatives from any ethnic and racial
minority neighborhood or community which lies near or in the proposed site.
Local leaders and elected officials would be the persons responsible for selecting
LRB members.
The proposed model purposefully creates a tension between the interests
of the TRB and the LRB. By its very nature the TRB (which would contain a
greater number of members from the technical fields) would be more likely to
weigh hard-technical criteria more heavily than the LRB. By contrast, the LRB
would be composed mainly of residents of the potential host community and
probably would emphasize soft-technical criteria. Unless the community as a
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whole wants to host a candidate site, the community probably would not want
to attain candidate site status. Therefore the LRB probably would do its best to
show that criteria are not met. The two divergent views could create, to a certain
degree, an adversarial relationship between the TRB and LRB, and this would be
of value to the state siting board (SRB): the SRB would have the benefit of seeing
two sides of the issue as presented by the TRB and LRB. The LRB also would
insure some degree of meaningful public participation even if residents
themselves are ambivalent or unwilling to participate in public hearings and
comment periods.
The proposal also allows for public hearings and comment periods, just as
many existing state siting schemes do. By opening the process to the general
public, the proposal accommodates other issues and questions that could arise, in
addition to those issues raised by local representatives on the SRB and LRB.
According to the proposed siting process, if a host site and a developer are
unable to reach an agreement on a compensation package, they would be
required to enter into a binding arbitration. The LRB would have the additional
duty of serving as the potential host community representative in the event that
arbitration becomes necessary. Under this scenario, there would be a degree of
public participation through the LRB during arbitration.
In the event that a local community does not have adequate resources to
participate meaningfully in the siting process, the siting scheme provides for
technical assistance grants. Also, communities chosen to serve as hosts for a
facility are guaranteed a compensation package as reimbursement for assuming
the facility and associated risks. These are discussed below.
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E. Technical Assistance Grants and Compensation
Finally, the proposed scheme provides for technical assistance grants to
the LRB and potential host community. This aspect is perhaps the most
important mechanism to promote public participation because it gives the direct
representatives of potential host communities the means to partake in the siting
process. Even if a potential host community was composed of technically and
politically unsophisticated and poor residents, the grants would allow them to
hire technicians and lawyers. With the assistance of these professionals, local
communities, through the LRB, would be able to produce thorough site
assessment reports and analyze the assessments of the TRB.314a They also
would be able to make informed decisions about the nature of risks associated
with a proposed facility and the amount of compensation needed to justify
assumption of those risks. To the extent that minority and low income
communities contain disproportionate numbers of hazardous waste facilities
because of the lack of meaningful participation in the siting process, as some
commentators have indicated, providing technical assistance grants would only
enhance public participation. Moreover, the LRB would be able to allocate funds
from the assistance grants to other parties interested (though lacking the
financial resources) in contributing to the siting process.
The scheme also provides for a minimum compensation package. 315 The
compensation reimburses host communities at least for all negative impacts of
the facility. Beyond this, the host community and state or developer can
314a The state is to provide the funding for technical assistance grants. In turn, the LRB is
to distribute these funds to persons and other parties interested in contributing to the siting
process who do not have adequate financial resources to do so.
3 15 See Laws & Susskind, supra note 75, at 37-38 discussing the need to "Iflully compensate
all negative impacts of a facility" (Credo element number seven) and to "[m]ake the host
community better off" (Credo element number ten).
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negotiate for additional compensation to make final site status as beneficial as
possible.
Factoring environmental equity into the any siting model involves an
assessment of trade-offs. A sample of how the siting model would balance
competing factors is discussed below.
F. Inherent Trade-offs
In spite of the proposed point system, the wide range of criteria creates
inherent conflicts. For instance, on the one hand developers are interested in
minimizing costs associated with constructing and operating a hazardous waste
facility. Yet, the proposed criteria include considerations of race, ethnicity, and
income -- three factors related to property values. Typically, persons in lower
income brackets and minorities live on land with lower property values relative
to values of property on which upper income groups live. Choosing between
low construction costs and not constructing all hazardous waste facilities in poor
and minority communities requires a balance: higher construction and operating
costs traded for lower incidence of hazardous waste facilities in these
communities. The proposal establishes that in the interest of environmental
equity, this tradeoff is necessary.
Another potential conflict lies in choosing optimal safe sites relative to
overall public health: in rural areas where both minority persons and poor
groups tend to live and where population densities are low, the potential for
noise, air, and soil contamination to affect people is low; therefore, rural areas
would be particularly attractive to developers. The trade-off here is clear: the
possibility of fewer sites in rural communities with majority poor and minority
populations at the cost of greater public heath risks in urban areas. The siting
scheme could produce results where rural minority populations are spared from
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hosting a facility, while the candidate site is located in more urban areas. Again,
the proposal posits that such tradeoff may occur in the interest of environmental
equity.
Yet another conflict could exist where a geologically safe site lies in the
middle of a community composed of minority and poor persons. Hard-
technical siting criteria would support candidate site status for the location, as
would the scientific community. On the other hand, soft-technical criteria would
work against candidate site status. As a result, the almost geologically perfect
and scientifically rational choice for a candidate site probably would not come to
be. Another, less "scientifically" suitable site, one that falls more in line with the
goals of environmental equity, would have to be found.
In a situation where a community wants to host a facility, perhaps because
of an attractive compensation package, the scheme may have several different
results depending on the circumstances. For instance, if the community is
already overburdened with facilities, geographic fairness holds that the
community not attain candidate site status, in spite of the community's
willingness. Another situation is where the community has a high percentage of
poor or minority persons but is not overburdened. The community may attain
candidate site status if past siting practices have not resulted in siting facilities
disproportionately in poor and minority communities. Considerations of
environmental equity proscribe further siting in poor and minority communities
even if the given community is not host to a facility. On the other hand, if the
willing community is minority and poor, is not overburdened with facilities, and
the history of siting results does not reveal disproportionate sitings in poor and
minority communities, environmental equity would not be violated by granting
the community candidate site or final site status.
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Because the proposed scheme and guidelines draw from existing models
and suggestions, it has some similar flaws. Nevertheless, the proposal would
promote equitable siting results.
G. Critique
The proposed siting model advances democratic ideals of equality in the
siting of hazardous waste facilities. The scheme honors the idea that public
policy should ensure that all groups are afforded equality of outcome by not
allowing siting results to have a disparate impact on the poor and minorities.
Because the state initiates the siting process, pursuant to the site designation
model, it can certify that the inventory of sites does not overwhelm particular
communities, thus advancing geographic fairness. Even when a facility is sited in
a community, the model calls for full compensation for assuming risks and all
other negative impacts
The siting model also guarantees and expands public participation in
several ways. First, local representation is institutionalized in the form of the
LRB. The LRB, as chief advocate for local residents, has equal footing with the
TRB in the preparation of independent and joint site assessment reports. Local
interests are represented at levels higher than just individual comments received
during public hearings. Even if residents are ambivalent, the LRB still would
serve as their advocate. Although the TRB and LRB are supposed to submit one
report to the SRB, the structure of the model allows for unrestricted freedom in
the event that both emphasize standard factors differently.
Second, the SRB contains local representation through revolving
membership. Even after the TRB and LRB have submitted their report(s), local
input continues at the higher level of decision-making.
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Additionally, the scheme is open to the general public. Public hearings
and comment periods offer ideal opportunities for interested parties not part of
the more formalized structure of the model to participate and contribute to the
process. In the event that interested parties (including the LRB) do not have
adequate resources to participate meaningfully, the scheme provides for
technical assistance grants.
Finally, the siting model considers public input before any final decisions
are made about potential site status, candidate site status, and even final site
status. This provides at least three opportunities for public participation during
the earlier stages of the process, and on through the final decision-making.
With much public input and a high degree of institutionalized local
representation, the scheme increases the chances for consensus and builds trust
among all parties. Also, the ability of the LRB to reflect the sentiments of local
communities at the various levels of the decision-making processes, contributes
to the legitimacy and evenhandedness of the scheme, especially in the eyes of the
public. Even the siting criteria, such as race and income, may contribute to the
siting's legitimacy because they incorporate important factors previously
ignored or downplayed in existing siting models.
Nevertheless, the proposed siting model also has some faults. The
proposal probably would have the same drawbacks as those of the super review
and site designation approaches. 315a For example, communities unwilling to
serve as potential candidate sites could avoid such status by volunteering sites
they already know are unsuitable, rather than those that possibly would attain
candidate site status.
315a Discussed in Part IV.D, supra.
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Another potential weakness of the model is that the scheme sets the stage
for conflict by calling for two separate and potentially opposing institutions, the
technical advisory board (TRB) and local review committee (LRB), to provide
separate assessments of the same proposed site. The LRB probably would be
less inclined to find a site suitable for candidate site status than the TRB because
the LRB would have the bias of being the direct representative of the proposed
site. If the community is opposed to the facility, then the findings of the LRB
(preliminary assessment report) would reflect this. By contrast, the TRB
probably would favor sites that meet hard-technical criteria. Given the disparity
between the interests of the TRB and LRB, preliminary reports submitted to the
state siting board probably would contain conflicting findings and conclusions.
Another drawback is that the proposed scheme places much authority in
the hands of the state siting board (SRB). If the TRB and LRB submit conflicting
preliminary findings and conclusion about the suitability of a site, the SRB would
have the difficult task of determining the status of the proposed site. This could
create an atmosphere of distrust, and may compromise the SRB's authority and
legitimacy in the eyes of local communities, especially if the SRB sides with the
TRB. Nonetheless, the final authority still must be assigned to avoid indefinite
perpetuation of the siting process. If the TRB and LRB cannot agree on a
preliminary assessment plan, there needs to be an authority that can resolve the
standoff. Even though the SRB would be endowed with great authority, it still
would be obligated to consider seriously the recommendations of the TRB and
LRB. As mentioned earlier, this consideration would be assured by the
"revolving" community members of the SRB.
Another weakness is that the proposed siting scheme relies on criteria that
may be difficult to document and study. For example, the site also could impact
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areas adjacent to or perhaps further away from host communities. Deciding
what geographic area is appropriate for study for potential impacts may not be
easy to do. Second, demographic trends could skew data. In a matter of years,
the minority composition of a community could change drastically. This could
undermine efforts at producing environmentally equitable results.316
Admittedly, some of the proposed criteria are difficult to document and study,
but so are many factors listed in existing state siting statutes. For example,
Kentucky calls for consideration of "psychic costs" in its siting program.317
Nonetheless, because data on race and income are readily available from census
information it is reasonable to include these in standard siting criteria.
Similarly, because facility siting is not solely a design problem, many
professionals beyond engineers are part of the team of professionals and
scientists needed. With so many different professions involved, there may be
conflict over what criteria are appropriate. Conflict may be particularly apparent
concerning the criteria of the model that are not typically found in a site
assessment report, such as race and income. On the other hand, this is already a
problem with existing schemes. There is nothing new about technicians and
professionals disagreeing over criteria.
In summary, though some aspects may be problematic, the proposed
guidelines and scheme address concerns raised by recent studies that show
hazardous waste facilities exist in disproportionate numbers in poor and
minority communities. The proposal serves three basic functions. First, it
introduces criteria, such as race, income, geographic fairness, and history of past
siting decisions into the siting decision-making process. Second, the scheme
institutionalized effective and influential local representation by way of the local
3 16 See Bacow, supra note 245, at 47.
31 7 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.40-310(7) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991).
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review board (LRB). Finally, the proposal ensures that environmental equity
issues are part of discussions over the siting of a hazardous waste facility. In this
manner, the proposal forces environmental equity issues into public discourse
rather than allow them to remain unnoticed or unimportant.
Whether the proposed model can effect environmental equity in
hazardous waste facility siting remains to be seen. A measure for its success,
however, is discussed below.
H. A Measure for Success
A comparison can be made to the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA). When NEPA was ratified in 1970, it established a national structure for
examining major federal projects.318 The law requires that an environmental
impact statement (EIS) be produced by federal agencies "for all major federal
actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment."319 Since
NEPA was enacted, however, the success of the law has been difficult to measure
because its effectiveness "includes the anonymous thousands of destructive
federal projects which are withdrawn, or never proposed in the first place, in
anticipation of NEPA [(EIS)] scrutiny."320
The success of the proposed scheme similarly would be difficult to
measure. Efficacy of the scheme would result in the abandonment of proposed
projects or a decision not to site a facility in a poor and minority communities or
in areas overburdened with facilities. Sites not considered for proposed site
status, or even candidate site status, because of concerns for environmental
equity also would be testimony of the proposal's effectiveness. In short, because
3 18 PLATER, supra note 99, at 596; see National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C.
§ 4331 (1988).
31942 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
32 0 PLATER, supra note 99, at 5%.
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the scheme's success lies in distributing facilities equally across all communities it
would be hard to account for facilities not sited because of the siting model.
Page 133
VII. CONCLUSION
High living standards in the United States are maintained by industries, which
generate tons of hazardous wastes that must be stored, treated, and disposed of
safely and efficiently. Hence, hazardous waste facilities will always be necessary.
There are many hazardous waste facilities in operation today, and more will be
needed in the future. Appropriate sites for future facilities must be found.
Because of the dangerous nature of hazardous wastes, health and economic risks
are associated with hazardous waste facilities. For this reason, hazardous waste
facilities are unwanted land uses: siting proposals frequently trigger public
opposition. Nevertheless, facilities have been sited in the past. There is
convincing evidence, however, that shows that poor and minority communities
are hosting a disproportionate number of these sited facilities.
To the extent that facilities are found disproportionately in poor and
minority communities, risks associated with facilities are borne unequally by
these communities as well. The evidence suggests that past siting practices may
have produced unequal siting results. Furthermore, a review of existing state
siting models reveals that they are not suited to distribute hazardous waste
facilities equally across race and income groups. A need exists for mechanisms to
generate more equitable distribution of these unwanted, yet necessary, facilities.
Solutions proposed by various commentators to effect environmental
equity are worthy of further study. Specifically, calls for a national mandate for
environmental equity, and enhanced public participation, geographic fairness,
and inclusion of race and income in state siting models have potential to promote
the equal distribution of hazardous waste facilities. The proposed siting model is
a step toward more equitable siting practices. Following the lead of existing
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recommendations, the model calls for factors of race, income, history of past
siting practices, and geographic fairness to be important considerations in future
sitings of hazardous waste facilities. The model also establishes that tradeoffs
between the need for hazardous waste facilities and the goal of environmental
equity should be resolved in favor of environmental equity. Although
inequitable results of past siting practices cannot be easily remedied, subsequent
sitings can be conducted so as to produce more equitable results.
